Martin v. Giordano
185 F. Supp. 3d 339
| E.D.N.Y | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Isa Martin sued NYPD officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York law for alleged excessive force and delayed medical care; case filed 2011 and amended; trial initially set for March 2016.
- Late in pretrial, John Nonnenmacher entered as trial counsel; pretrial submissions were repeatedly late or noncompliant, despite multiple court orders and warnings.
- On the morning trial was to begin, co-counsel Jason Leventhal filed a letter stating Nonnenmacher’s mother had died and sought an adjournment; that representation later proved inaccurate.
- Leventhal and Nonnenmacher gave various excuses (family deaths, firm move, hospitalization); the court found persistent violations of pretrial orders and Rule 16 obligations by both attorneys.
- Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case with prejudice shortly before trial. Defendants moved for sanctions and attorney’s fees under multiple authorities; court considered privilege issues and reviewed ex parte material in camera.
- Court: denied §1988 fee award to defendants (no finding that plaintiff’s suit was frivolous on the record); issued public reprimands to Leventhal and Nonnenmacher; referred calculation of reasonable expenses to Magistrate Judge Orenstein; referred counsel conduct to the Committee on Grievances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants are entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (defendants prevailing) | Martin: dismissal does not prove suit was frivolous; contradictions could be explained at trial; privilege shields reasons for dismissal | Defendants: eve-of-trial voluntary dismissal and record inconsistencies show suit was frivolous and warrant §1988 fees | Denied — court will not infer frivolousness from late dismissal and, after in camera review, found privilege barred probing the client’s motives; record insufficient to find frivolousness |
| Whether plaintiff should be sanctioned under Rule 11, Rule 16, or inherent authority | Martin: he was not personally responsible for counsel’s failures; Rule 16 and other sanctions target attorneys | Defendants: plaintiff shares responsibility and should bear sanctions/fees | Denied — plaintiff not personally shown to have violated orders; client not punished for attorneys’ misconduct |
| Whether Leventhal and Nonnenmacher should be sanctioned (Rule 11, Rule 16, §1927, inherent authority) | Counsel: offered explanations (miscommunication, illness, family emergencies); Leventhal denied knowing falsehood; Nonnenmacher claimed severe illness and confusion | Defendants: persistent noncompliance with pretrial orders, misrepresentation about death, and delays multiplied costs warrant sanctions and fee-shifting | Partly granted: court found multiple Rule 16 violations by both attorneys, ordered public reprimands, and required payment of reasonable expenses (including fees) attributable to those specific violations (amount referred to Magistrate). Rule 11, §1927, and inherent-authority sanctions denied for lack of clear evidence of bad faith or claims entirely without color |
| Whether an evidentiary hearing was required before imposing sanctions | Plaintiff/counsel: opposed expanded fact-finding; privilege limits probing; counsel offered declarations | Defendants: sought hearing to probe motives and alleged misrepresentations | Denied: court held oral argument and accepted written submissions; due process satisfied; no live evidentiary hearing required because record and submissions sufficed and privilege limited further inquiry |
Key Cases Cited
- Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 1999) (standards for bad-faith sanctions and inquiry into frivolousness)
- Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2000) (objective unreasonableness standard under Rule 11)
- Ransmeier v. Mariani, 718 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing sanctions against client and counsel; analyze conduct separately)
- Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2000) (two-part test for sanctions under inherent authority/§1927: lack of color and bad faith)
- Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986) (difference between §1927 and inherent authority sanctions)
- Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (U.S. 1980) (standard for awarding fees to prevailing defendants under §1988)
- Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1978) (explanation of frivolous/unreasonable standard for fee awards to defendants)
- Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Mar. S.A., 782 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1986) (need for specific factual findings when inferring bad faith)
- Ted Lapidus, S.A. v. Vann, 112 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1997) (due process requirements before imposing sanctions)
- Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (U.S. 1990) (sanctions are collateral to underlying case and district court’s sanctioning authority)
- Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1986) (limitations on Rule 16 sanctions where orders were not specific)
