Martin K. Eby Construction Co. v. Onebeacon Insurance
777 F.3d 1132
10th Cir.2015Background
- Martin K. Eby Construction Co. (Eby) contracted to build a water pipeline and its predecessor engaged Kellogg Brown & Root (Kellogg); Eby’s predecessor promised to indemnify Kellogg for claims “directly or indirectly arising from or caused by or in connection with” Eby’s work.
- While constructing the pipeline, Eby struck an adjacent methanol pipeline, causing a leak that was discovered over 20 years later; the pipeline owner cleaned up and sued Kellogg and Eby for various claims (fraud, nuisance, restitution, CERCLA and Texas SWDA violations).
- Kellogg incurred over $2 million defending those claims and sued Eby (and Eby’s insurer, Travelers) seeking indemnity under Eby’s contractual promise and insurance coverage tied to assumed liabilities.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Eby and Travelers; Kellogg appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
- The central legal question: whether Eby’s broad indemnity clause is enforceable under Texas’s “fair notice” (express negligence/conspicuousness) rule when it effectively covers claims based on the indemnitee’s (Kellogg’s) own fault.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Kellogg) | Defendant's Argument (Eby/Travelers) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the indemnity clause covers claims based on Kellogg’s own fault | Clause is broad and covers claims arising from Eby’s work, so it indemnifies Kellogg for defenses even when claims allege Kellogg’s fault | Clause may be broad but enforceability is governed by Texas fair notice rule before it can cover indemnitee’s fault | Clause does reach claims alleging Kellogg’s fault, but enforceability is subject to fair notice rule |
| Whether the Texas fair notice (express-negligence) rule applies when the clause does not explicitly mention indemnitee fault | Fair notice shouldn’t apply because Kellogg’s suit seeks indemnity for Eby’s conduct (jury found Eby caused the damage) | Fair notice applies when indemnity would cover indemnitee’s fault even if implicit | Fair notice applies; Texas precedent (Ethyl, Fisk) treats implicit coverage of indemnitee fault as triggering the rule |
| Whether the indemnity clause is conspicuous/express enough under the fair notice rule | The clause was referenced in a 4-page exhibit and thus provided notice; Kellogg had actual knowledge | Clause is buried in a 197-page single-spaced contract with no conspicuous formatting; no admissible evidence of actual notice | Clause is not conspicuous and Kellogg waived and failed to prove actual notice; clause unenforceable |
| Whether Travelers must provide coverage because Eby made (even unenforceable) promise or assumed Kellogg’s liabilities | Even if unenforceable, the promise was made and Travelers’ policy covers liabilities assumed by Eby, so Travelers must cover Kellogg’s defense costs | Without an enforceable indemnity, Eby did not assume Kellogg’s liability and Travelers has no obligation | Travelers not liable: unenforceable indemnity means Eby did not assume Kellogg’s liabilities, so no insurance coverage for Kellogg |
Key Cases Cited
- Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Const. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987) (express negligence rule requires explicit contractual language to indemnify indemnitee for its own negligence)
- Fisk Elec. Co. v. Constructors & Assocs., Inc., 888 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1994) (applies express negligence rule where indemnity clause implicitly covers indemnitee fault)
- Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993) (fair notice rule requires indemnity for indemnitee fault to be conspicuous and express)
- Storage & Processors, Inc. v. Reyes, 134 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. 2004) (examples of conspicuous formatting that can satisfy fair notice)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (definition of "arranger" under CERCLA informing when conduct constitutes intentional steps to dispose of hazardous substance)
- Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 664 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2011) (distinguishes additional-insured coverage from indemnity-based coverage; cited to reject a different theory of coverage)
