937 F.3d 998
7th Cir.2019Background
- Seven named plaintiffs (Hispanic/Latino applicants) alleged they were denied line-worker jobs at Ford’s Chicago plant due to a racially discriminatory hiring scheme led by UAW chair Allan Millender and involving the Harvey unemployment office and Ford/Aon testing procedures.
- Hiring process: applicants submit pre-application at Harvey unemployment office → Ford forwards info to Aon for pre-employment basic skills testing → passing applicants undergo drug/background checks and further hiring steps.
- EEOC charges (filed Feb 2016) alleged discrimination focused on the basic skills test and post-test stalling/refusal to hire Hispanic/Latino applicants; charges stated Hispanic applicants are allowed to apply and take tests but rarely pass.
- In federal suit (Apr 2017) plaintiffs pleaded two Title VII claims: Count I — disparate treatment based on pre-test interference/destruction of application info (pre-test discrimination theory); Count II — disparate impact caused by the basic skills test (skills-test disparate impact theory).
- District court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, finding the complaint’s pre-test interference allegations were not "like or reasonably related" to the EEOC charges; plaintiffs appealed.
- Seventh Circuit held Count I (pre-test interference) was not exhausted and affirmed its dismissal (modified to be without prejudice), but vacated dismissal of Count II (skills-test disparate impact) as it was reasonably related to the EEOC charges and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint's claims are "like or reasonably related" to EEOC charges (exhaustion) | EEOC charges put Ford on notice of discriminatory hiring scheme; complaint's alternative pre-test theory is part of same scheme | Charges focused on testing/post-test stalling; pre-test destruction/interference is a different theory and inconsistent with charges | Count II (skills-test disparate impact) is exhausted and survives; Count I (pre-test interference) is not exhausted and dismissal affirmed (modified to without prejudice) |
| Whether Count II states a plausible disparate-impact claim (Rule 12(b)(6)) | Allegations of racial disparity between Ford’s workforce and local demographics, implicating the pre-employment test, suffice at pleading stage | Plaintiffs lack detailed statistical proof; Adams requires greater specificity in complex disparate-impact claims | Pleading adequate: basic factual allegations and photographs suffice to survive a motion to dismiss; defendant may rebut at summary judgment/trial |
| Whether dismissal without leave to amend was an abuse of discretion | Plaintiffs requested leave to amend in opposition brief (single sentence) and could cure defects if allowed | Single-sentence request was not a proper motion; plaintiffs never filed a proposed amended complaint | No abuse: failure to file a proper motion means district court did not err; dismissal remanded without prejudice for exhaustion reasons |
Key Cases Cited
- Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., 966 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir.) (EEOC exhaustion gives employer notice and opportunity to conciliate)
- Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497 (7th Cir.) (charge and complaint must at minimum describe same conduct and individuals)
- Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 525 F.3d 520 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff cannot sue on claims inconsistent with EEOC charge)
- Teal v. Potter, 559 F.3d 687 (7th Cir.) (liberal construction of EEOC charges; counsel’s involvement weakens liberal construction)
- Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720 (7th Cir.) (disparate-impact plaintiffs may plead basic statistical allegations but complex claims require greater specificity)
- Calderon-Ramirez v. McCament, 877 F.3d 272 (7th Cir.) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal: accept well-pleaded allegations)
- Rocha v. Rudd, 826 F.3d 905 (7th Cir.) (appellate court may affirm on any record-supported basis)
- NewSpin Sports, LLC v. Arrow Electronics, Inc., 910 F.3d 293 (7th Cir.) (leave to amend ordinarily given after 12(b)(6) dismissal if timely requested)
- Wagner v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 840 F.3d 355 (7th Cir.) (district court not required to grant sua sponte amendment the plaintiff never requested)
- Greene v. Meese, 875 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.) (dismissals for failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be without prejudice)
- Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516 (7th Cir.) (authority on statistical proof for disparate-impact claims)
- Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 88 F.3d 506 (7th Cir.) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff failed to provide sufficient statistical evidence)