Martha McNeely v. US Dept. of Labor, 14-16381

Background

Martha J. McNeely (appellant) sought survivor benefits under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) after her father (referred to as "Senior") died; DOL denied benefits and the district court granted summary judgment to defendants, upholding the denial.
McNeely challenged DOL’s Part B determinations: that Senior’s cancer diagnosis was not established with acceptable medical evidence and that the probability-of-causation calculation was correct.
McNeely also raised a Part E claim as a surviving child, arguing she was a "covered child" and thus eligible for benefits; the district court found it lacked jurisdiction to consider Part E but alternatively ruled she failed to show she was incapable of self-support at Senior’s 1981 death.
DOL declined to treat McNeely’s submitted non‑medical documents as sufficient medical evidence under its regulations and excluded certain WPPSS/Hanford employment years from covered employment in the probability-of-causation calculation.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard and affirmed the denial of benefits, finding DOL’s explanations reasonable and supported by the record.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether DOL improperly refused McNeely’s non‑medical evidence to establish Senior’s specified cancer diagnosis under Part B	McNeely: submitted documents suffice to establish the required diagnosis	DOL: regulations require reliable medical evidence/opinions from medical professionals; submitted materials were not adequate	Court: DOL’s interpretation and refusal were reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious (agency expertise warranted deference)
Whether the probability-of-causation calculation was flawed by excluding Senior’s 1965–1967 WPPSS work at Hanford	McNeely: excluding those years improperly lowered causation and was arbitrary	DOL: record indicates that work was for a public utility (not DOE-covered employment), so exclusion was proper	Court: DOL’s rationale was plausible; exclusion was not arbitrary or capricious
Whether the district court had jurisdiction over McNeely’s Part E claim	McNeely: district court had jurisdiction to decide Part E claim	DOL/defendants: jurisdictional challenges; district court questioned jurisdiction under statutory scheme	Court: assumed jurisdiction without deciding; affirmed denial on the merits (court did not need to resolve jurisdiction definitively)
Whether McNeely met the statutory definition of a "covered child" under Part E at Senior’s 1981 death	McNeely: she was a dependent/incapable of self-support and thus covered	DOL: McNeely failed to show incapacity to self-support in 1981	Court: McNeely failed to prove incapacity; denial under Part E was not arbitrary or capricious

Key Cases Cited

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (agency interpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous)
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (arbitrary and capricious standard and requirements for reasoned explanation)
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (agency decisions of less-than-ideal clarity upheld if path reasonably discernible)
Vigil v. Leavitt, 381 F.3d 826 (deference to agency expertise on technical factual matters; careful review required)
Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229 (deference when issues require technical expertise)
Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (courts defer to agency expertise on technical matters)
Watson v. Solis, 693 F.3d 620 (interpretation of "incapable of self-support" under EEOICPA Part E)
United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (jurisdictional analysis referenced for context)
Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969 (standard of review for final agency action)