Martha Hernandez v. State
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 585
Tex. App.2014Background
- Martha Hernandez was convicted by a jury of murder and tampering with/fabricating physical evidence; concurrent sentences of 60 and 20 years were imposed. Her convictions are not challenged on sufficiency grounds.
- A burned corpse (Christy Espinosa) was found; autopsy concluded suffocation and that the body was doused with gasoline; Hernandez’s military ID was found at the scene.
- Hernandez was arrested in Eagle Pass on March 7 and gave recorded statements on March 7, March 8, and March 9. The March 9 interview (about 11:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m.) is the primary subject of suppression claims.
- March 8 statements placed Hernandez and her husband Kenneth with Espinosa in the car and described actions culminating in Espinosa being doused with gasoline and set on fire; March 9 added admissions that both placed hands over Espinosa’s mouth and other details.
- Hernandez moved to suppress the March 9 statement and sought suppression of a hotel-room statement she allegedly made to her sister-in-law Rebecca; the trial court denied suppression on both fronts and the court of appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hernandez) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Voluntariness — references to separation from children | Smith’s repeated remarks about her kids and prison coerced a confession (due process). | Remarks were permissible interrogation tactics and accurate warnings about potential consequences; did not overbear her will. | Court held statements about children did not render March 9 statement involuntary. |
| 2. Voluntariness — promises/threats of leniency or punishment | Smith promised leniency for cooperation and threatened reporting to judge/DA for non-cooperation, coercing admission. | Statements were vague, not an express quid pro quo or concrete threat; Miranda warnings given; totality shows voluntariness. | Court held vague promises/threats did not overbear will; confession voluntary. |
| 3. Article 38.21 — promise-induced statement | Promise to tell the judge she “did the right thing” unlawfully induced statement under art. 38.21. | No positive promise of leniency or authority to bind prosecutor; statements optimistic/vague, insufficient to render statement involuntary. | Court held no statutory violation; March 9 statement admissible. |
| 4. Article 38.23 — Rebecca’s testimony about motel-room statement | Rebecca obtained Hernandez’s statement while Kenneth/Rebecca secretly restrained or deceived Hernandez into returning from Mexico, so statement is tainted and inadmissible. | Trial court found Hernandez voluntarily returned; Hernandez failed to produce evidence of deception/restraint; State complied. | Court held Hernandez failed to meet burden to show unlawful restraint/deception; Rebecca’s testimony admissible. |
Key Cases Cited
- Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (totality-of-circumstances test for voluntariness; coercive government misconduct required)
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (U.S. 1986) (confession involuntariness requires causal relation to coercive police misconduct)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (totality-of-circumstances and suspect characteristics considered in voluntariness analysis)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (U.S. 1991) (totality-of-circumstances governs voluntariness of confessions)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial warnings designed to prevent coercion during interrogations)
- Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (U.S. 1984) (Miranda’s safeguards relieve courts from extensive post-hoc voluntariness inquiries)
- Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (de novo review of mixed questions of law/fact on suppression when facts undisputed)
- Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (article 38.21 voluntariness analyzed under totality of circumstances)