Marten Transport, Ltd., a Foreign Corporation, and Caroline Hurst v. Kathleen E. Lucas (mem. dec.)
45A03-1612-CT-2937
| Ind. Ct. App. | Aug 16, 2017Background
- On January 11, 2011, Kathleen Lucas lost control of her Acura on an icy I‑65; a tractor‑trailer driven by Caroline Hurst struck the driver’s side. Lucas sustained severe, permanent injuries (pelvic fractures, lacerated bladder, collapsed lung, concussion, chronic pain, migraines, cognitive deficits) and required prolonged hospitalization and rehab.
- ECM data from the truck recorded speeds showing the truck was ~50 mph up to ~12–20 seconds before impact and 23–36 mph at impact; data indicated Hurst did not remove her foot from the accelerator until ~10 seconds before impact and did not brake until 1–2 seconds before impact.
- Lucas sued Hurst and her employer, Marten Transport, alleging negligent operation of the truck; defendants asserted comparative fault and other defenses.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment (denied); moved to bifurcate liability and damages (denied); moved to limit testimony of plaintiff’s liability expert (Green) and treating neurologist (Dr. Allen) (denied or issues waived); two tendered jury instructions were refused.
- A jury found both Lucas and Hurst 50% at fault and awarded $5,000,000 in damages (net judgment to Lucas $2,500,000 after 50% reduction). Defendants’ motions to correct error were denied; they appeal and the appellate court affirms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of summary judgment | Lucas: genuine issues of fact exist on breach, proximate cause, and damages. | Hurst: no breach as she drove a reasonable speed for conditions and Lucas’s own negligence bars recovery. | Affirmed. Defendants waived detailed summary‑judgment argument and in any event did not meet moving‑party burden; negligence determinations are fact questions. |
| Denial of bifurcation (liability vs. damages) | Lucas: joint trial appropriate; jury can fairly apportion fault despite sympathy for injuries. | Defendants: plaintiff’s severe injuries would prejudice jury; bifurcation needed for fairness and economy. | Affirmed. Trial court did not abuse discretion; jurors assigned 50% fault to plaintiff, indicating no undue prejudice. |
| Exclusion/limitation of liability expert (Thomas Green) | Lucas relied on Green to connect truck speed/braking to collision causation. | Defendants argued Green impermissibly vouched for truthfulness of Hurst’s testimony and gave improper opinions. | Defendants waived most challenges by failing to contemporaneously object; where objection sustained, no evidence was admitted. No reversible error. |
| Limitation of Dr. Allen’s testimony (treating neurologist) | Lucas presented Dr. Allen’s ongoing treatment and opinion of causation and permanence of neurologic injury. | Defendants argued failure to supplement discovery (medical records post‑March 2013) warranted exclusion. | Affirmed. Defendants failed to object at trial and in fact introduced/used Dr. Allen’s later notes (invited error); other discovery‑based arguments were waived. |
| Refusal of two tendered jury instructions | Lucas relied on court’s instructions; plaintiff argued instructions given were adequate. | Defendants tendered instructions limiting duty (need not take every possible precaution) and an instruction stating plaintiff’s sole proximate cause means verdict for defendants. | Affirmed. First tendered instruction was incomplete/misleading when standing alone; second was redundant of other instructions covering duty, burden, comparative fault, and proximate cause. |
| Challenge to 50/50 fault apportionment | Lucas: evidence supports shared fault given truck speed, failure to brake/slow, and expert opinion. | Defendants: undisputed facts show plaintiff’s lane change and loss of control caused the crash; she must be >50% at fault. | Affirmed. Apportionment of fault is for the jury; evidence supported a reasonable basis for 50/50 split and court will not reweigh evidence. |
| Excessiveness of $5M damages award | Lucas: damages supported by catastrophic injuries, permanent pain, loss of career prospects, ongoing care/medication. | Defendants: award is excessive and unsupported; argue plaintiffs overstated permanency and causation. | Affirmed. Award is within bounds of the evidence; appellate court will not substitute its view for the jury’s reasonable assessment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 2014) (summary judgment standard reviewed de novo)
- Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P’Ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184 (Ind. 2016) (movant’s heavy factual burden on summary judgment)
- Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277 (Ind. 2012) (appellate review limited to evidence designated at summary judgment)
- Cox v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (negligence cases are fact sensitive; summary judgment disfavored)
- Frito‑Lay, Inc. v. Cloud, 569 N.E.2d 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (factors for bifurcation and defendant’s burden to show strong liability defense)
- Wilkerson v. Harvey, 814 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (drivers owe duty to use ordinary care; speed in hazardous conditions is fact question)
- Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1994) (standards for reviewing excessiveness of jury damage awards)