Marshall Welton v. Shani Anderson
770 F.3d 670
7th Cir.2014Background
- Welton, a real-estate businessman, had a line of credit with National Bank of Indianapolis (NBI); after disputes over repayment, NBI VP George Keely provided information to Indianapolis police.
- Officer Shani Anderson submitted an affidavit leading to Welton’s arrest on charges of theft and fraud on a financial institution; Welton was released on his own recognizance and later acquitted at trial.
- In 2013 Welton sued Anderson, Keely, and NBI under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (malicious prosecution) alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and also brought state-law malicious prosecution claims against Keely and NBI.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); the district court granted dismissal of the federal claims, finding Welton failed to allege a constitutional violation, and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- On appeal, Welton argued he pleaded viable Fourteenth Amendment (due process) and Fourth Amendment (continuing seizure) malicious-prosecution claims; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Welton pleaded a Fourteenth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim | Welton: prosecution without probable cause and “fundamental unfairness” violated due process | Defendants: there is no federal right not to be prosecuted without probable cause; no other constitutional deprivation alleged | Court: Dismissed — malicious prosecution alone is not a Fourteenth Amendment violation without an independent constitutional deprivation |
| Whether Welton pleaded malice and other state-law elements supporting § 1983 claim | Welton: alleged Anderson intentionally presented false facts and Keely supplied false statements | Defendants: allegations are conclusory; complaint lacks factual allegations of malice or inadequate investigation | Court: Dismissed — conclusory assertions insufficient to show malice required by Indiana law |
| Whether a Fourth Amendment claim survives beyond arraignment under a “continuing seizure” theory | Welton: asks court to adopt/expand continuing-seizure doctrine so prosecution-related restraint is a seizure | Defendants: Seventh Circuit precedent rejects continuing-seizure theory; Welton’s freedom-of-movement wasn’t restricted after release | Court: Dismissed — continuing-seizure rejected; seizure ended when prosecution began; facts do not show a non-de minimis seizure |
| Whether dismissal was proper on Rule 12(b)(6) review | Welton: complaint plausibly alleges constitutional violations | Defendants: complaint fails Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard for constitutional claims | Court: Dismissed — under Twombly/Iqbal and circuit precedent, allegations are not factually sufficient to state § 1983 claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2013) (malicious-prosecution under § 1983 requires an independent constitutional deprivation)
- Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (scope of Fourth Amendment seizure and pleading standards)
- Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2013) (Indiana law does not provide adequate remedy for malicious prosecution, permitting federal claims)
- Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2011) (no federal right not to be prosecuted without probable cause)
- Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2010) (acquittal and state-court vindication supply procedural due process; rejecting continuing-prosecution theory)
- Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2001) (malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires a constitutional violation)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must state facts making claim plausible)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)