532 S.W.3d 563
Ark.2017Background
- On Nov. 25, 2013, Robert Paschal returned home and discovered items displaced; he, Kelly Williams, and Amy Hornaday entered the house and called 911.
- A man—identified by Paschal as Kenneth Marshall—emerged from a room holding a hammer; Marshall followed the women out and threatened to come back and kill Paschal while holding the hammer raised above his head.
- Police found blood under a broken bedroom window and a blood smear on a television; DNA testing matched Marshall to the blood under the window.
- Marshall admitted being inside Paschal’s house and possessing the hammer; he denied threatening Paschal. Williams testified she felt threatened by the hammer.
- Marshall was convicted by a jury of aggravated residential burglary (and commercial burglary); he appealed, arguing the State failed to prove necessary elements for aggravated residential burglary.
Issues
| Issue | Marshall's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence was sufficient that Marshall entered/remained with intent to commit an offense | On appeal, Marshall argued the State did not prove he entered/remained with specific intent to commit a criminal offense | State relied on testimony, DNA, and Marshall’s admission to show unlawful entry and intent; at trial Marshall did not preserve this claim | Not reached on the merits — claim not preserved for appeal because it was not raised in the directed-verdict motion at trial |
| Whether the State proved Marshall was armed with a "deadly weapon" while in the residence | Argued that a hammer, as used, was not a deadly weapon and evidence was insufficient | State argued a hammer can be a deadly weapon depending on manner/intended use and the jury should decide credibility and facts | Affirmed — sufficient evidence for jury to find hammer was a deadly weapon based on manner/position, threat, and witnesses' testimony |
| Whether jury's acquittal on terroristic threatening undercuts finding of deadly-weapon intent | Argued acquittal shows jury rejected threat/intent to kill, undermining deadly-weapon finding | State noted jury may acquit some counts for compromise or lenity; separate verdicts can coexist | Rejected — acquittal on one count does not preclude conviction on another; jury may credit evidence differently across counts |
| Preservation and standard of review for directed verdict (sufficiency) | Marshall contended directed-verdict denial was error | State pointed to rule requiring specific grounds for directed-verdict motions and standard deferring credibility to jury | Court reviewed sufficiency standard, viewed evidence in light most favorable to State, and affirmed denial of directed verdict |
Key Cases Cited
- Brooks v. State, 498 S.W.3d 292 (Ark. 2016) (directed-verdict motion treated as challenge to sufficiency of evidence)
- Mercouri v. State, 480 S.W.3d 864 (Ark. 2016) (substantial-evidence standard and review view evidence favoring the State)
- Starling v. State, 480 S.W.3d 158 (Ark. 2016) (jury resolves credibility and inconsistent evidence)
- Sylvester v. State, 489 S.W.3d 146 (Ark. 2016) (issues not raised at trial are forfeited on appeal)
- Jordan v. State, 917 S.W.2d 164 (Ark. 1996) (jury may convict on some counts and acquit on others for reasons other than insufficiency)