Marshall v. Morton, 421 F. App'x 832

Marshall, an Oklahoma state prisoner at Cimarron Correctional Facility, filed a pro se §1983 complaint alleging due process, equal protection, and state-law claims arising from a disciplinary proceeding for possession of a cellular phone.
Defendants include CCF officials (warden, security chief, and disciplinary hearing officer) and ODOC officials (director and administrative review authority); CCA-affiliated defendants and a former officer are named.
Disciplinary sanctions included 30 days in segregation, loss of 365 earned credits, and a 90-day reduction in inmate classification level; Marshall sought damages and injunctive relief.
The district court dismissed his federal claims with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, which were dismissed without prejudice.
On appeal, the panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the due process and equal protection claims with prejudice and affirmed the dismissal of state-law claims without prejudice; the renewed in forma pauperis request was denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Marshall's disciplinary proceedings implicate a protected liberty interest?	Marshall asserted the 85% rule and policy deviations created a liberty interest.	Defendants argued no protected liberty interest existed; process satisfied Wolff and there was no entitlement to earned credits.	No protected liberty interest; due process claim properly dismissed.
Is Marshall's equal protection claim viable given differences in treatment for 85% rule inmates?	Marshall claimed differential treatment not related to legitimate penological purposes.	Departmental policy serves legitimate penological purposes; 85% inmates are convicted of serious crimes.	Equal protection claim dismissed with prejudice for lack of adequate challenge to penological purposes.
Was the district court correct to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing federal claims?	Marshall urged continuation of state-law claims in district court.	Court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction once federal claims were dismissed.	Affirmed; state-law claims dismissed without prejudice.

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (liberty interests require atypical, significant hardship or duration impact)
Hill v. Wolf? Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985) (due process requires basic procedural safeguards when liberty interests implicated)
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process in disciplinary hearings requires notice, opportunity to present evidence, and a written reasoned decision)
Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367 (10th Cir. 1994) (standard for equal protection challenges to penological classifications)
Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399 (10th Cir. 1996) (no liberty interest in prison employment; generally in penological context)
Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433 (10th Cir. 1996) (due process in disciplinary contexts; relevant factors for notice and opportunity to be heard)
DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1991) (standard for frivolous pro se appeals in §1983 actions)
Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007) (standard for reviewing dismissal under 12(b)(6) for plausibility)
Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410 (10th Cir. 2004) (Heck considerations not jurisdictional; analysis of underlying claims)
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (nonfrivolous standard for determining appealability in forma pauperis)