Marshall v. Indiana University
170 F. Supp. 3d 1201
S.D. Ind.2016Background
- Marshall, a 19-year-old IUPUI sophomore and resident advisor, was placed on interim suspension, evicted from campus housing, and banned after a student accused him of sexual assault; no criminal charges were filed and no physical evidence is alleged.
- Marshall reported he was also sexually assaulted by a female student; the university did not investigate that claim.
- Marshall was initially denied copies of evidence, forced to view evidence in a controlled room without copying, and restricted from contacting potential student witnesses; his attorneys were limited to observing and taking handwritten notes but could not participate at the hearing.
- A three-person panel (with the Assistant Dean as non-voting coordinator) heard the case; the university presented through an assistant director with a law degree, Marshall largely represented himself, the accuser did not testify, hearsay evidence was used, and the panel applied a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
- The panel found Marshall guilty; he was expelled and banned for life; his administrative appeal was denied. Marshall sued alleging violations of due process, free speech, Title IX, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; defendants moved to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Marshall received constitutionally sufficient due process in the disciplinary proceedings | Marshall: expulsion for alleged sexual assault warrants greater procedural protections (counsel participation, access to evidence, higher evidentiary standard, unbiased panel) | Defendants: student disciplinary hearings require only notice and an opportunity to be heard; no right to full counsel participation; ‘‘some evidence’’ suffices | Court: Dismissed due process claims — procedure provided met existing Indiana/Seventh Circuit standards; individual defendants entitled to qualified immunity |
| Whether denial of ability to interview witnesses violated free speech | Marshall: preventing interviews impeded his ability to prepare defense and violated free speech | Defendants: no constitutional right to investigate or interview witnesses in school disciplinary context; rights of criminal defendants do not apply | Court: Dismissed free speech claims; no recognized First Amendment right to interview witnesses in this context; qualified immunity for individuals |
| Whether Marshall stated a § 1983 claim based on Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth Amendment violations | Marshall: broad constitutional violations were pled | Defendants: complaint lacks particularized facts showing constitutional violations | Court: Dismissed § 1983 claim as conclusory and because no underlying constitutional violation was plausibly alleged |
| Whether Marshall stated a Title IX claim for sex discrimination | Marshall: school disciplined him (male) while not investigating his report of being assaulted by a female — suggestive of intentional gender bias/selective enforcement | Defendants: plaintiffs must plead particularized facts showing intentional discrimination; discovery needed | Court: Denied dismissal as to Title IX claim against the institutions (Indiana University and IUPUI); Title IX claims against individual defendants dismissed; Title IX survives to permit discovery |
Key Cases Cited
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (complaint allegations assumed true on motion to dismiss)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (conclusory allegations insufficient)
- Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school disciplinary proceedings require notice and some hearing)
- Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (educational dismissals need not mirror criminal trials)
- Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221 (7th Cir. 1993) (no right to full lawyer participation in university disciplinary hearing)
- Medlock v. Trs. of Indiana Univ., 738 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2013) (upholding administrative exclusion in light of alleged criminal activity)
- Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (Title IX relief available against institutions, not individual school officials)