Marshall v. Honeywell Technology Systems, Inc.
73 F. Supp. 3d 5
D.D.C.2014Background
- Sandra Marshall, a long-time NASA contractor, alleges age, sex, and race discrimination and filed EEOC/Prince George’s County charges in Dec 2003–Feb 2004 after her employment ended on Dec 31, 2003.
- While the charges were pending, Marshall filed pro se for Chapter 7 bankruptcy (Sept 2005) but did not list her pending discrimination charges or the later-filed lawsuit on her bankruptcy schedules or Statement of Financial Affairs; she listed other suits where she was a defendant.
- The bankruptcy discharged (Feb 2006) and closed as a no-asset case (June 2006); Marshall later filed the instant suit (Dec 2005) and the Trustee initially was substituted as plaintiff when the bankruptcy reopened, then abandoned the suit in Jan 2011, reverting the case to Marshall.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing judicial estoppel based on Marshall’s failure to disclose her claims in bankruptcy; Marshall argued nondisclosure was inadvertent and that she had informed the Trustee.
- The Court applied the D.C. Circuit’s Moses framework, found clear inconsistency, judicial acceptance of the prior position (bankruptcy discharge/no-asset), and that Marshall derived an unfair advantage; it rejected inadvertence as an excuse given her disclosures of other claims and motive to conceal.
- The Court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment, barring Marshall’s discrimination claims under judicial estoppel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judicial estoppel bars Marshall’s discrimination suit given her failure to disclose the claims in bankruptcy | Marshall says nondisclosure was inadvertent (pro se) and she told the Trustee about the EEOC claim | Defendants say nondisclosure was a clear, prejudicial inconsistency that unfairly advantaged Marshall and misled courts/creditors | Court held judicial estoppel applies and barred the suit due to nondisclosure and resulting unfair advantage |
| Whether reopening bankruptcy and later disclosure cures nondisclosure | Marshall contends reopening and disclosure should remedy omission | Defendants argue reopening after being challenged is insufficient and undermines disclosure incentives | Court held reopening/amendment after the fact insufficient to avoid estoppel; allowing it would incentivize concealment |
| Whether oral disclosure to the Trustee excuses failure to list claims on schedules | Marshall asserts she informed the Trustee of the EEOC claim | Defendants contend the schedules (signed under penalty of perjury) must contain the disclosures; oral notice is not equivalent | Court held oral disclosure to Trustee did not satisfy statutory disclosure duties and does not excuse estoppel |
| Whether pro se status or inadvertence negates judicial estoppel | Marshall argues pro se status and mistake justify nondisclosure | Defendants point to intentional motive and that she disclosed other adverse claims, showing knowledge and motive | Court rejected inadvertence/pro se excuse: nondisclosure was not inadvertent and motive to conceal was apparent; estoppel applies |
Key Cases Cited
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (judicial estoppel prevents asserting a position inconsistent with one successfully maintained in earlier proceedings)
- Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying judicial estoppel to bar nondisclosed discrimination claim in bankruptcy)
- Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing judicial estoppel principles in D.C. Circuit)
- Barger v. City of Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) (oral disclosure to trustee insufficient to cure failure to list claim on bankruptcy schedules)
- Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting motive to conceal in bankruptcy is evident from potential financial benefit)