Marshall Lloyd v. Ford Motor Co., 65 F.4th 851

Plaintiffs (putative class of consumers) allege Ford submitted false fuel-economy test data to the EPA for certain F-150 and Ranger model years by manipulating coastdown/road‑load testing, producing overstated EPA mpg figures used in advertising.
EPA’s statutory/regulatory regime (EPCA and implementing regs) prescribes detailed dynamometer and coastdown procedures, requires manufacturers to submit testing records, empowers the EPA to review/confirm or reject data, and culminates in EPA‑adopted fuel‑economy estimates that appear on vehicle labels.
Plaintiffs’ independent testing purportedly showed lower “real‑world” mpg than the EPA estimates; they brought state‑law claims (fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, unjust enrichment) under laws of multiple states in an MDL proceeding.
The district court dismissed the consolidated complaint, holding federal law preempted the state‑law claims; EPA and DOJ investigations into Ford closed without further agency action before dismissal.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding plaintiffs’ claims are impliedly preempted because they conflict with the federal regulatory scheme that authorizes the EPA to set, police, and correct fuel‑economy estimates.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether state‑law fraud/consumer claims challenging Ford’s testing and EPA mpg figures are preempted	State duties parallel federal rules; plaintiffs can enforce through state torts without displacing federal control	Claims would second‑guess the EPA, intrude on agency’s exclusive testing/approval and fraud‑policing functions	Preempted: implied conflict preemption (claims dismissed)
Whether Supreme Court precedents (e.g., Wyeth/Medtronic/Silkwood) allow parallel state remedies	Cases permit state remedies that run parallel to federal requirements and do not obstruct federal objectives	Buckman and its progeny control here: the EPA’s regulatory balance and enforcement discretion would be undermined by state claims	Buckman controls; Levine/Medtronic distinguishable—EPA (not manufacturer) finalizes figures and balances competing objectives
Whether consumer‑fraud claims are independent of fraud‑on‑the‑EPA claims	Consumer injury claims stand on advertising/representations to consumers, separate from EPA process	Any consumer claim depends on and effectively challenges EPA‑approved mpg figures, thus is preempted	Preempted: consumer claims would permit juries to usurp EPA’s role and rebalance its policy judgments

Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (state fraud‑on‑the‑agency claims conflict with federal regulatory scheme and are preempted)
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (state failure‑to‑warn claims not preempted where manufacturer could unilaterally change label)
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011) (preemption where manufacturer could not satisfy state duties without federal agency action)
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (state tort claims preempted where they conflict with agency's policy balancing)
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (state remedies may survive where claims are traditional torts not dependent on federal requirements)
Silkwood v. Kerr‑McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (federal regulation did not preempt state tort remedies in that context)
Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v. DowElanco, 275 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Buckman to EPA pesticide‑labeling scheme)
Garcia v. Wyeth‑Ayerst Laboratories, 385 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004) (state fraud‑on‑the‑FDA claims preempted under Buckman)