888 F.3d 839
6th Cir.2018Background
- In 2010, then-15-year-old Marshall Garber was treated by Dr. Heriberto Menendez in Ohio and subsequently became paraplegic; Garber’s malpractice suits had earlier been dismissed for procedural defects or lack of service.
- Garber turned 18 on August 5, 2013; Ohio law gives minors one year after turning 18 to bring medical-malpractice claims (Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.113) and generally tolls limitations when a defendant departs the State (§ 2305.15).
- Dr. Menendez moved from Ohio to Florida in April 2014 and retired there; Garber properly served him and sued in May 2017, invoking Ohio’s departure tolling to preserve timeliness.
- Menendez removed to federal court and moved to dismiss, arguing that Ohio’s tolling rule, as applied to a resident who moved out of state, violates the dormant Commerce Clause by discouraging relocation and interstate commerce.
- The district court agreed and dismissed; the Sixth Circuit panel reversed, holding the tolling statute does not unconstitutionally discriminate against interstate commerce and survives deferential review on this record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Garber) | Defendant's Argument (Menendez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dormant Commerce Clause: Does Ohio’s tolling statute discriminate against interstate commerce? | Tolling allowed suit despite Menendez’s move; Garber: statute is valid and tolled limitations. | Law discriminates by discouraging Ohio residents from relocating and offering services elsewhere, burdening interstate commerce. | No facial or purposeful discrimination; statute is neutral and treats in-state and out-of-state actors evenhandedly. |
| Pike balancing: Does the statute’s incidental burden on interstate commerce outweigh local benefits? | Garber: statute serves local interests in allowing plaintiffs to sue defendants who leave the State. | Menendez: tolling imposes burdens on interstate market and relocation choices; benefits are obsolete given long-arm jurisdiction. | Court: challenger must show concrete burdens; Menendez offered no evidence. The local benefits (practical ability to locate/serve defendants) suffice on this record. |
| Travel / Privileges & Immunities: Does tolling unconstitutionally encumber right to travel or deny fundamental rights to nonresidents? | Garber: statute does not burden travel or deny fundamental rights. | Menendez: tolling encumbers free movement and treats nonresidents differently. | Court: not a right-to-travel or fundamental-rights violation; statute-of-limitations protections are not fundamental; Saenz and related precedent do not help Menendez. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (establishes historic requirement of in-state service for personal jurisdiction)
- Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (Due Process permits jurisdiction based on sufficient contacts; long-arm jurisdiction replaces need for in-state physical service)
- Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (balancing test for nondiscriminatory state laws that incidentally affect interstate commerce)
- McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (upholding a state’s provision of certain benefits to residents only; distinguishes protectionist commerce burdens)
- Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888 (struck an application of Ohio’s tolling statute where it imposed indefinite liability costs on interstate businesses)
- Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (right-to-travel analysis; limitations on benefits to new residents do not necessarily bar travel)
- United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (distinguishing facial discrimination against interstate commerce)