Marshall, E. Pierce, Ind. & v. Estate of J. Howard Marshall
471 S.W.3d 498
Tex. App.2015Background
- Marshall II died in 1995 survived by Vickie Lynn Marshall and two sons, Marshall III and Pierce Marshall.
- Texas probate proceedings opened to admit Marshall II’s will and codicil and to address an estate administered through a Louisiana Living Trust.
- Marshall III challenged validity of the will and trust instruments and pursued various claims against Pierce, Hilliard, and others for breach of fiduciary duties and improper transfers.
- Vickie filed a California Chapter 11 bankruptcy and asserted defamation against Pierce, along with tort claims including tortious interference with an intended inter vivos gift.
- While bankruptcy and California actions progressed, Vickie filed a will contest in Texas probate court, asserting residuary and other trust-related claims; the probate case culminated in a December 7, 2001 final judgment.
- After extensive litigation, the California and federal courts addressed jurisdiction and preclusion, with the Supreme Court ultimately holding that the probate exception did not bar the federal claims, and the Ninth Circuit and district court subsequent rulings addressed core vs non-core issues and sanctions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether declaratory judgments were properly allowed after Vickie nonsuited her claims | Stern argues declaratory claims survive as sanctions-focused and violate Rule 162 | Marshall defendants contend declaratories address estate rights and prevent abuse | Declaratory claims properly presented a justiciable controversy |
| Whether Vickie’s tortious-interference claims could be compulsory counterclaims in Texas probate | Vickie’s California claims were separate from probate and not compulsory | The claims related to estate administration and could be compulsory counterclaims | Tortious-interference claims could be compulsory counterclaims in the probate proceeding |
| Whether the declaratory judgments impermissibly attempted to defeat potential tort liability in California | Declaratories sought only estate-rights, not liability against Pierce | Declarations could be used to negate potential liability in California | Declarations were within the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act's scope and proper |
| Whether the judgment’s broad jurisdiction recitations were proper or overly broad | Recitations improperly asserted exclusive probate-jurisdiction over torts | Recitations were needed to define rights and administration, within probate scope | Paragraph 3.1 was modified to fix overbreadth; otherwise judgments affirmed with reform |
| Whether the awarded sanctions and attorney’s fees against Vickie were proper | Fees were warranted based on sanctions and declaratory-relief actions | No jury findings on reasonableness/necessity; fees should be controlled by jury | Reversed and rendered against Pierce for fees against Vickie; Pierce take nothing on that claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (U.S. 2006) (probate exception does not bar in personam tort judgments; core issues remain)
- In re O’Quinn, 355 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. App.—Houston 2011) (foundation interest allows declaratory relief in probate context)
- Greenhalgh v. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1990) (trial amendments and prejudice standards in rule 66 context)
- Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1998) (reasonableness/necessity of attorneys’ fees require jury findings)
- Howell v. Mauzy, 899 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995) (mere fear of future actions not enough for declaratory relief)