Marsh v. Anesthesia Services Medical Group, Inc.
132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 660
Cal. Ct. App.2011Background
- Appellant M. Lou Marsh, a California anesthesiologist, sues ASMG and Scripps/Ximed for alleged unlawful practices affecting her practice.
- She alleges Cartwright Act and UCL violations, plus intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage and IIED.
- Trial court sustained demurrers to several claims; TAC allowed amendment only as to ASMG interference with economic advantage.
- Appellant alleged ASMG/Scripps conspired to limit her practice, including call rules, utilization rules, and status reclassification.
- Scripps was affirmed on its dismissal; ASMG dismissal reversed to permit amended pleading on intentional interference with economic advantage.
- Appellant sought to reinstate a breach-of-contract claim; the court permitted amendment as to ASMG for the interference claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cartwright Act viability | Appellant asserts antitrust injury via market-wide harm. | Insufficient market definition and injury; no viable restraint shown. | Cartwright Act claims failed; no cognizable market-wide injury shown. |
| UCL viability | Unfair practices harmed competition and justified injunctive relief/restitution. | No predicate unfair acts; harm is individualized, not to competition. | UCL claim dismissed; no public-antecedent unfair conduct shown. |
| Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (ASMG) | Defendants’ acts intentionally disrupted her relationship with surgeons; defamation alleged as wrongful acts. | Motive alone not enough; must plead independently wrongful acts. | ASMG: claim viable; remand to allow amended pleading on independent wrongfulness and proximate causation. |
| Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (Scripps) | Scripps’ actions targeted her practice and interfered with economic expectancy. | Scripps’ conduct falls within administrative hospital governance; not independently wrongful. | Scripps: dismissal affirmed; no independently wrongful conduct shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 20 Cal.4th 163 (Cal. 1999) (unfair competition standards; incipient violations require connection to competition)
- Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 77 Cal.App.4th 171 (Cal. App. 1990) (high pleading standard for antitrust violations; market analysis required)
- Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134 (Cal. 2003) (elements of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; independence of wrongfulness)
- Exxon Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.App.4th 1672 (Cal. App. 1997) (rule-of-reason for vertical restraints; market-wide effects required)
- Oltz v. St. Peter’s Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (healthcare restraints analyzed under rule of reason; market definition aids injury assessment)
- County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Community Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (defendant's plausible business justifications may negate antitrust conspiracy claims)
- Mateo-Woodburn v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical Center, 221 Cal.App.3d 1169 (Cal. App. 1990) (hospital staffing decisions given deference; public interest in care quality)
- Redding v. St. Francis Medical Center, 208 Cal.App.3d 98 (Cal. App. 1989) (judicial deference to hospital administrative decisions)
- Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134 (Cal. 2003) (reiterates independence of wrongfulness and causation requirements)