458 P.3d 203
Idaho2020Background
- In October 2005 Marsalis and K.G. drank heavily; K.G. later reported vomiting, painful urination, bruising, and partial/complete amnesia for the night and alleged Marsalis raped her.
- No blood or breath tests were taken; the State’s expert, Dr. Marc LeBeau, used the Widmark formula (retrograde extrapolation) and the Dubowski chart to estimate BACs, opining K.G. was at 0.28 ("stupor") and Marsalis at 0.16 ("excitement").
- Marsalis was tried (change of venue), convicted of rape in 2009, and received an indeterminate life sentence; his direct appeal affirmed the conviction.
- Marsalis filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IAC) for: (1) failing to challenge LeBeau’s methodologies/admitibility or retain rebuttal/expert testimony, (2) failing to call a favorable eyewitness (John Hampton), and (3) failing to advise him of speedy-trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).
- The district court summarily dismissed all claims; the Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the eyewitness claim, reversed the dismissal of the expert/IAD-related claims, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing and notice on the IAD issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Marsalis) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not moving to exclude Dr. LeBeau’s Widmark/Dubowski testimony under I.R.E. 702/403 | LeBeau’s methodologies (Widmark retrograde extrapolation without a baseline and Dubowski chart application) are scientifically unreliable; affidavits from two experts show material factual dispute and counse l should have moved to exclude | LeBeau is a qualified expert; prior authority generally accepts retrograde extrapolation when properly applied; objection would have been denied and counsel’s tactical choice to not challenge was reasonable | Reversed and remanded: genuine issue of material fact exists as to admissibility; counsel’s failure to move was not justified as strategic; evidentiary hearing required |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to retain/rely on defense experts to rebut LeBeau and explain alcohol-induced blackouts | Defense experts would have impeached LeBeau’s methods and explained blackouts (memory impairment despite competence to act), undermining the State’s theory that K.G. was unconscious | Trial counsel cross-examined LeBeau; proposed experts would only impeach methodology and not change core evidence; no showing of likely prejudice | Reversed and remanded: genuine issues of fact on both deficiency and prejudice about failure to obtain rebuttal and blackout experts; evidentiary hearing required |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not calling John Hampton as a defense eyewitness | Hampton would have contradicted parts of State witnesses’ testimony (no force, no difficulty exiting the shuttle) and affected the verdict | Hampton’s statements were weak, inconsistent, based on inattention and drinking; strategic not to call him; calling him would not have affected outcome | Affirmed: no genuine issue of material fact that counsel’s omission was deficient; decision not to call Hampton was reasonable tactical choice |
| Whether counsel failed to advise Marsalis of IAD 120-day speedy-trial rights and whether district court erred in summary dismissal without notice | Counsel failed to inform Marsalis of the 120‑day statutory IAD deadline; waiver was not knowing and case likely would have been dismissed | State argued Marsalis waived speedy-trial rights for discovery/venue and there was good cause for continuance; any error was harmless (no prejudice) | Reversed in part and remanded for procedural notice: district court relied on grounds different from State’s motion (counsel waived for the defendant) and should have given 20 days’ notice; district court should afford Marsalis opportunity to respond |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong deficient performance/prejudice test for IAC)
- Dunlap v. State, 159 Idaho 280 (2015) (applies Strickland standard in Idaho post‑conviction context)
- Thumm v. State, 165 Idaho 405 (2019) (failure to file motion analysis and when such failure resolves both Strickland prongs)
- Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (factors for evaluating reliability of retrograde extrapolation)
- New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000) (counsel may waive statutory speedy‑trial scheduling rights in ordinary scheduling matters)