Marrone, M. v. Dalonzo, F.
404 WDA 2017
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Nov 21, 2017Background
- In June 2010, Edward Kapczynski executed a deed transferring his Moon Township house to cousins Frank Dalonzo Jr. and Tina Sabol for $1; he was not represented by independent counsel and continued living in the home paying expenses.
- Kapczynski was diagnosed with dementia in August 2013; medical records from before and shortly after the 2010 deed showed no recorded cognitive problems.
- Plaintiff (later substituted by guardian Margie Anne Marrone) sued in May 2015 seeking rescission and damages, alleging Kapczynski lacked capacity and that the cousins diverted funds via a power of attorney.
- Defendant-cousins moved for summary judgment; plaintiff opposed with two lay affidavits (Cupelli and Hailstock) describing observations of confusion in 2010.
- Trial court granted summary judgment, excluding portions of the lay affidavits as medical opinions and finding no genuine issue of material fact; plaintiff appealed.
- The Superior Court reversed and remanded, holding some portions of the lay affidavits were admissible and, when viewed in the non-movant’s favor, created a triable issue on capacity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were lay affidavits admissible to show Kapczynski lacked capacity? | Affidavits described observed confusion in 2010 and thus are admissible factual observations. | Affidavits impermissibly opined on medical diagnosis/competency and lacked expert foundation. | Portions describing observed behavior (confusion, not recognizing people) are admissible; pure medical diagnoses or capacity opinions are not. |
| Did the admissible affidavit material create a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment? | The lay observations, combined with potential expert proof at trial, raise a triable issue as to capacity at the time of the deed. | Medical records and contemporaneous affidavit from the closing attorney show competency; no admissible evidence shows incapacity in 2010. | Viewing admissible lay evidence in favor of non-moving party, the record presents a genuine issue of fact on capacity; summary judgment improper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Nobles v. Staples, 150 A.3d 110 (Pa. Super. 2016) (summary judgment standard; view record in light most favorable to non-moving party)
- In re Mampe, 932 A.2d 954 (Pa. Super. 2007) (lay witnesses may testify to observable behaviors bearing on mental condition but not to medical diagnoses)
- Cominsky v. Donovan, 846 A.2d 1256 (Pa. Super. 2004) (distinguishing permissible lay testimony about observable condition from impermissible medical diagnosis)
- Sobel v. Sobel, 254 A.2d 649 (Pa. 1969) (capacity is judged at the time of the transaction; testimony of observers of the critical time is highly probative)
- Girsh Trust, 189 A.2d 852 (Pa. 1963) (capacity presumed; evidence before and after the transaction can shift burden to show competence)