Marra v. Commissioner of Correction
166 A.3d 678
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Thomas Marra was convicted in two separate cases (Noel and Palmieri) of serious felonies and later sought habeas relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
- Marra filed multiple habeas petitions; two later petitions (consolidated as CV-05) were scheduled for trial repeatedly and finally set to begin October 23, 2012.
- On October 22, 2012, Marra executed and signed a written withdrawal of the CV-05 habeas action; the next day Judge Pavia canvassed Marra on the record, confirmed the withdrawal was voluntary, warned that refiling could be opposed, and stated on the record that the withdrawal would be "with prejudice."
- Less than a month later Marra filed a new, substantially identical habeas petition asserting ineffective assistance by his prior habeas lawyers; the Commissioner pleaded defenses including deliberate bypass, res judicata, and procedural default.
- The habeas court (Judge Sferrazza) heard limited evidence on those defenses, found Marra’s testimony on incapacity not credible, independently concluded the prior withdrawal should be treated as with prejudice (citing procedural chicanery / waiver), and dismissed the petition; the appellate court reversed only as to form, directing denial rather than dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the habeas court impermissibly gave preclusive effect to Judge Pavia’s on‑the‑record statement that the CV‑05 withdrawal was "with prejudice" | Marra: Judge Pavia’s ruling was improper because no hearing on the merits had commenced under § 52‑80 and Kendall requires permitting withdrawal without prejudice. | Commissioner: Court may treat the prior withdrawal as with prejudice when facts show procedural gamesmanship and finality concerns. | Court held Sferrazza did not merely apply Pavia’s ruling as preclusive but made an independent, legally correct determination that withdrawal was with prejudice given the record and Marra’s conduct. |
| Whether Kendall categorically forbids deeming a pre‑hearing withdrawal "with prejudice" | Marra: Kendall establishes that if a merits hearing has not commenced, withdrawal cannot be conditioned as with prejudice. | Commissioner: Kendall is distinguishable; courts retain discretion to limit withdrawal rights in certain circumstances (e.g., procedural chicanery). | Court held Kendall did not control; prior withdrawal may be deemed with prejudice in circumstances showing abuse of withdrawal right. |
| Whether Marra’s refiling was barred by deliberate bypass / abuse of writ / waiver | Marra: His refiling should be permitted; prior withdrawal was involuntary or tainted by illness/medication. | Commissioner: Marra knowingly withdrew on the eve of trial to avoid likely failure; refiling is an attempt to evade prior court order and stale evidence concerns. | Court agreed with Commissioner that Marra’s conduct amounted to procedural chicanery/waiver such that the claims are barred. |
| Proper procedural disposition when withdrawal with prejudice does not implicate subject‑matter jurisdiction | Marra: Dismissal was improper; unclear argument that jurisdictional defect existed. | Commissioner: Dismissal was appropriate to end litigation. | Court held the substance ruling was correct but form was wrong: where dismissal rests on non‑jurisdictional grounds (withdrawal with prejudice), the petition should be denied, not dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kendall v. Commissioner of Correction, 162 Conn. App. 23 (Conn. App. 2016) (discusses when a habeas hearing has "commenced" under § 52‑80 and limits on conditioning withdrawal)
- Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 147 Conn. App. 748 (Conn. App. 2014) (recognizes withdrawal with prejudice is available in appropriate circumstances and discusses limits on unilateral withdrawal)
- Palumbo v. Barbadimos, 163 Conn. App. 100 (Conn. App. 2016) (refusal to permit refiled identical action when withdrawal constituted procedural chicanery to avoid consequences of prior litigation)
- Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124 (Conn. 1993) (explains deliberate bypass doctrine and that intentional relinquishment by petitioner bars habeas review)
- Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (U.S. 1963) (origin of deliberate bypass concept permitting denial of federal habeas relief when petitioner intentionally bypassed state remedies)