Marquise Lee v. State of Indiana
2015 Ind. LEXIS 394
| Ind. | 2015Background
- On Sept. 7, 2012 Ramon Gude was killed after an altercation; three defendants (Latoya Lee, Marquise Lee, and Billy Young) were charged only with murder (alleging death by shooting) and conspiracy to commit murder (overt act: the shooting).
- At a joint bench trial, evidence showed a group entry, a fistfight, Young handing a gun to Marquise (who fumbled but did not fire), then someone—an unidentified man—fired shots; Defendants appeared surprised.
- After the State's case, the trial court granted the defendants’ Rule 41(B) motion as to murder and conspiracy (finding reasonable doubt that a planned shooting occurred) but invited argument on lesser included battery offenses; defense counsel did not object.
- The court then convicted the defendants of attempted aggravated battery (based on a planned beating) and sentenced them to 15 years—despite the charging information and State theory focusing exclusively on a shooting.
- The Court of Appeals panels split: one reversed (holding lack of fair notice), the other affirmed; the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer in both appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wright’s inherent/factual-inclusion tests alone determine when a lesser offense may be submitted | Wright controls; attempted aggravated battery is inherently included in murder so lesser conviction is permissible | Charging murder by shooting did not give fair notice of attempted aggravated battery by beating | Inherent/factual inclusion necessary but not always dispositive; fair notice can require the lesser offense stem from the same charged means |
| Whether Defendants lacked fair notice when charged only with murder by shooting but convicted of attempted aggravated battery by beating | The charging elements encompass inherently included offenses regardless of means alleged | Charging information and State theory focused on shooting; conviction based on beating was a different means and deprived fair notice | Fair notice lacking here because the conviction rested on a critical operative fact (beating) never alleged or reasonably within the charging theory (shooting) |
| Whether failure to object at trial forfeits review of the inclusion/fair-notice issue | No forfeiture; Wright and related precedent allow review | Defendants waived the issue by not objecting or by not raising it on appeal (Lee initially) | Although Rule 46 did not excuse the lack of objection, the error was fundamental and reviewable due to the unique prejudice caused |
| Remedy: Whether convictions must be reversed and acquittals entered | State urged affirmance or remand | Defendants argued reversal/acquittal due to fundamental error and lack of notice | Convictions reversed; judgments of acquittal ordered and cases remanded accordingly |
Key Cases Cited
- Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995) (establishes inherent and factual lesser-included-offense tests)
- Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (U.S. 1989) (defendant cannot be held to answer charges not contained in the indictment)
- Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (U.S. 1980) (juries may convict of lesser included offenses)
- Miller v. State, 753 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 2001) (distinguishes when lesser conviction does not raise fair-notice due process concerns when means overlap)
- Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274 (Ind. 2014) (sets standard for fundamental error review)
- Garcia v. State, 433 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (defendant entitled to limit defense to matters charged)
- Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1887) (historical principle on charging specificity and amendment)