330 Conn. 575
Conn.2019Background
- In 2003 Miguel Delgado was murdered during a robbery; two eyewitnesses (Valle and Clement) identified Julian Marquez as the gunman and selected his photo from a photographic array.
- Marquez gave a statement placing himself at the scene but blaming Edwin Soler for the shooting; Soler was arrested and later testified at Marquez’s trial that Marquez was the shooter.
- At trial Soler denied any promises or benefits for his testimony; the prosecutor acknowledged hypothetical discussions with Soler’s counsel about possible post‑testimony leniency but represented no promises on the record.
- Marquez was convicted of felony murder and related charges; Soler’s felony murder charge was later not pursued and he was sentenced on lesser counts after cooperating.
- Marquez sought habeas relief claiming the state failed to disclose an undisclosed agreement with Soler (Brady/Giglio/Napue claim) and failed to correct Soler’s allegedly false testimony; the habeas court denied relief and denied certification to appeal; Appellate Court dismissed the appeal; the Supreme Court granted certification on limited issues.
- The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that a nondisclosed agreement might have existed but held any nondisclosure (and any failure to correct false testimony) was immaterial to the jury’s verdict and affirmed on that basis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the habeas court abused its discretion by denying certification to appeal | Marquez argued the habeas court erred in finding no undisclosed agreement and wrongly denied certification | State argued the habeas court acted within discretion; certification denial was proper | Court did not reach abuse‑of‑discretion question because it affirmed on alternative ground of immateriality |
| Whether the state violated Brady/Giglio/Napue by failing to disclose an agreement with cooperating witness Soler and by allowing or failing to correct false testimony | Marquez contended the state had an undisclosed leniency understanding with Soler and failed to correct Soler’s false denial, which was material impeachment evidence | State argued no formal agreement existed pretrial and, even if discussions occurred, any nondisclosure was immaterial given the strength and corroboration of the state’s evidence | Assuming an agreement existed, the Court held nondisclosure and any uncorrected false testimony were immaterial—no reasonable likelihood disclosure would have affected the jury verdict |
| Whether supervisory relief or rulemaking should be used to require clearer disclosure of plea/leniency understandings | Marquez sought stronger disclosure rules to prevent juror misunderstanding of witness incentives | State cautioned about committing to outcomes before testimony; Court noted federal practice of written cooperation agreements but did not invoke supervisory rule here | Court declined to exercise supervisory authority but urged prudence and recommended clearer on‑the‑record practice or rulemaking to memorialize such understandings |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to accused when material to guilt or punishment)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence including agreements with witnesses must be disclosed; false testimony that is material requires reversal)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor must correct known false testimony where it may affect the jury’s judgment)
- State v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 354 (2014) (false testimony materiality standard: reversal if any reasonable likelihood the false testimony affected jury)
- State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173 (2010) (Brady framework; plea agreements with witnesses constitute impeachment evidence)
- State v. Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686 (2006) (Brady standard and definition of materiality)