Marnika Lewis v. Governor of Alabama
944 F.3d 1287
11th Cir.2019Background
- In 2015–2016 the City of Birmingham adopted Ordinance No. 16-28, immediately raising the city minimum wage to $10.10 and creating a private right of action and fines for noncompliance.
- The Alabama Legislature enacted Act No. 2016-18 (HB 174), preempting local wage mandates and declaring them void, which had the effect of nullifying Birmingham’s ordinance.
- Two Birmingham employees (Marnika Lewis and Antoin Adams) earning below $10.10 sued the State, the Alabama Attorney General (AG), the City, and the Mayor, alleging Act 2016-18 was enacted with racial discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; they sought declaratory and injunctive relief (including orders against the AG and to compel city enforcement).
- The AG had issued a press release around the ordinance’s passage reassuring businesses they would have reasonable time to comply; plaintiffs alleged the AG’s statements and enforcement authority caused employers not to pay and the City not to enforce.
- The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing. A panel reversed as to the AG; the Eleventh Circuit reheard en banc and held plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue the AG because they failed to show traceability and redressability, so the court did not reach Ex parte Young or the merits of the equal‑protection claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing — injury‑in‑fact | Lewis/Adams: economic loss from not receiving $10.10 is a concrete, particularized injury. | State/AG: plaintiffs sued the wrong defendant; harm flows from employers/Act, not AG. | Court: injury‑in‑fact satisfied (economic loss). |
| Traceability — causal link to AG | Plaintiffs: AG’s press release, authority, and failure to warn/act caused employers and City not to implement/enforce the ordinance (ex ante and ex post theories). | AG: no statutory duty to “inform”; AG has not enforced nor threatened enforcement; Act operates automatically to void ordinance so AG did not cause the harm. | Court: traceability not shown; plaintiffs cannot fairly trace their injury to the AG. |
| Redressability — would relief against AG remedy harm? | Plaintiffs: declaratory judgment and injunction against AG would significantly increase likelihood the City enforces ordinance and employers pay $10.10. | AG: a judgment against AG would not bind nonparty employers or state courts; Act contains no AG enforcement role; any change depends on independent third‑party choices (speculative). | Court: redressability not satisfied — relief against AG would not significantly increase likelihood of plaintiffs getting $10.10. |
| Procedural/relief scope — Ex parte Young and merits | Plaintiffs: AG is a proper Ex parte Young defendant and plead discriminatory intent sufficient to proceed to merits. | Defendants: even if arguable, lack of standing deprives court of jurisdiction to reach Ex parte Young or merits. | Court: declined to reach Ex parte Young and merits because no Article III jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (articulating injury‑in‑fact, traceability, and redressability requirements for Article III standing)
- Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (no standing where AG neither enforced nor threatened enforcement of challenged statute)
- Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2015) (causation requires defendant possess authority to enforce complained‑of provision)
- Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (standing defeated where enforcement rests with private parties, not named state official)
- Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (declaratory relief against an official can be redressive when practical consequences make relief likely)
- N.E. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (injury in equal‑protection challenges is denial of equal treatment, not necessarily loss of ultimate benefit)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (standards for identifying discriminatory intent and causal inference)
- ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) (state courts may render binding decisions on federal questions absent exclusive federal jurisdiction)