Marmon Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
726 F.3d 387
| 3rd Cir. | 2013Background
- John Eckman was awarded BLBA benefits in 1993 and received payments until his death on May 2, 2002. His widow, Ethel Eckman, filed a survivor claim five days after his death; that claim was denied for failure to prove death due to pneumoconiosis and the denial became final in 2006.
- The Affordable Care Act (ACA) §1556 (amending 30 U.S.C. §932(l)) restored automatic entitlement for survivors of miners who were eligible for benefits at death, and applied to claims filed after Jan. 1, 2005 that were pending on or after the ACA enactment date (Mar. 23, 2010).
- After the ACA amendment, Ethel filed a new (subsequent) claim in Sept. 2010; the DOL awarded benefits and an ALJ upheld the award, relying on the amended §932(l) to grant survivor benefits without proof that death was caused by pneumoconiosis.
- Marmon (employer/carrier) appealed, arguing (1) the ACA’s applicability does not extend to "subsequent" survivor claims and (2) res judicata/finality barred a post-amendment award because her earlier claim was finally denied.
- The Benefits Review Board affirmed the award (modifying effective date), and Marmon petitioned for court review. The Third Circuit denied review, upholding that the amended §932(l) covers qualifying subsequent claims and that res judicata does not bar Eckman’s new cause of action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ACA §1556(c) applies to "subsequent" survivor claims filed after Jan. 1, 2005 and pending on enactment | Eckman: amended §932(l) plainly covers claims filed after Jan. 1, 2005, including subsequent claims pending on enactment | Marmon: §1556(c) does not expressly reference subsequent claims; legislative history and finality imply exclusion | Held: Plain language covers claims (no exclusion for subsequent claims); Senator Byrd statement not persuasive to limit scope |
| Whether res judicata bars a subsequent survivor claim premised on the amended statute where an earlier claim was finally denied on cause-of-death grounds | Eckman: subsequent claim asserts a different cause of action tied to an administrative entitlement (miner’s prior award), so res judicata does not apply | Marmon: final denial should preclude re-litigation; Pittston precedent supports refusing re-opening finally decided matters | Held: Res judicata does not bar the subsequent claim because it involves a different cause of action (different material facts and proof) |
| Whether awarding benefits on the subsequent claim violates principles of finality/due process for the employer | Eckman: statute authorizes relief; employer’s finality interest does not override the new statutory cause of action | Marmon: due process/finality interests harmed by allowing post-amendment awards after final denial | Held: No separate due process violation; the ruling rests on statutory grant and res judicata analysis rather than relaxed finality concerns |
| Whether deference to DOL/Director’s interpretation (Skidmore) affects outcome | Eckman/Director: DOL views amendment as creating new entitlement route for qualifying survivors | Marmon: DOL interpretation should not dictate coverage of subsequent claims | Held: Court decides statutory scope on plain-language grounds and does not rely on administrative deference; result stands regardless of Skidmore deference |
Key Cases Cited
- B&G Constr. Co. v. Director, OWCP, 662 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.) (interpreting ACA §1556 to revive automatic survivor entitlement)
- Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988) (discussing limits on re-opening finally adjudicated BLBA claims)
- Lombardy v. Director, OWCP, 355 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2004) (Board’s legal determinations reviewed de novo)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (degree of deference due to agency interpretations)
- Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (federal common law governs preclusion/privity analysis)