Marlow Humbert v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City
866 F.3d 546
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- In April 2008 a woman in Baltimore was raped; police collected a description and a composite sketch and circulated a wanted poster.
- Officers showed the victim various photo arrays/photobooks; after seeing Humbert’s photo she reacted emotionally, wrote “that’s him” on the photo, but also said she could not positively identify the attacker without a physical lineup and hearing his voice.
- On May 9–10, 2008 officers circulated a second wanted flyer and obtained an arrest warrant stating the victim positively identified Humbert; he was arrested and held in solitary pretrial detention for ~15 months.
- The officers received DNA reports between June and December 2008 excluding Humbert as the source, and the victim repeatedly said she could not positively identify him; the prosecutors did not receive those reports until May 2009 and then entered a nolle prosequi.
- Humbert sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution and related state claims; a jury found officers liable and awarded $2.3M, but the district court set aside the verdict holding officers had probable cause and qualified immunity.
- The Fourth Circuit reversed in part: it held the warrant application contained a recklessly false/misleading statement and omitted material facts, the corrected affidavit would not establish probable cause, and the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity; the jury verdict was to be reinstated and proceedings against municipal defendants remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the warrant affidavit contained a materially false statement or recklessly omitted facts that negated probable cause | Humbert: affidavit falsely stated the victim "positively identified" him and omitted that an officer had shown the victim a photo earlier and that she said she could not ID him without a lineup/voice | Officers: victim’s strong emotional reaction and "that’s him" were a positive ID; the affidavit should be corrected to note her caveat about needing a lineup | Held: affidavit contained a false/recklessly misleading statement; excising it and adding omitted facts, the corrected affidavit would not establish probable cause |
| Whether the untainted facts (resemblance to composite, location, timing) independently established probable cause | Humbert: resemblance + distant-in-time presence and suggestive officer conduct do not supply probable cause | Officers: close resemblance to description/sketch and vicinity supported probable cause | Held: resemblance and being in the neighborhood eight days later were insufficient; probable cause lacking absent the false/misleading identification |
| Whether officers’ failure to disclose exculpatory DNA reports and the victim’s inability to ID Humbert rendered maintenance of prosecution unreasonable | Humbert: officers received exclusionary DNA reports and did not promptly furnish them to prosecutor despite requests, thereby sustaining the prosecution without probable cause | Officers: prosecutors typically obtain lab reports; any delay did not make their conduct constitutionally unreasonable | Held: evidence supports that officers withheld/excluded material information and that prosecutors maintained the case without proper basis; detention/prosecution violated the Fourth Amendment |
| Whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity | Humbert: Fourth Amendment and Franks-based law clearly prohibit reckless misstatements/omissions to obtain warrants; reasonable officers would know this conduct violated rights | Officers: reliance on apparent positive ID was reasonable; Reddy suggests an officer’s objective reasonableness controls | Held: right was clearly established and a reasonable officer would have doubted the identification given suggestive conduct and the victim’s caveats; qualified immunity denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2008) (standard for viewing trial evidence on post-trial motions)
- Cahaly v. LaRosa, 796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015) (definition of probable cause for arrest)
- Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (probable cause concept for arrests)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (totality-of-the-circumstances approach to probable cause)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (standard for challenging veracity of warrant affidavits)
- Miller v. Prince George’s County, 475 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2007) (reckless disregard and materiality in Franks analysis)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (credence to nonmoving party’s evidence on post-trial motions)
- Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (probable cause supported by close temporal/geographic proximity plus matching description)
- Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (pretrial detention pursuant to process unsupported by probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment)