900 F.3d 1257
11th Cir.2018Background
- At birth, E.R.T. suffered profound brain damage during delivery by Dr. Ata Atogho, a physician employed by a federally supported community health center; he is in a near-vegetative state with a 30-year life expectancy.
- Parents (Dixon and Reese‑Thornton) sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for medical negligence and vicarious liability; district court found the United States liable following a bench trial.
- The district court awarded $20,965,146 in future economic damages (present value $13,860,943.91) and authorized periodic payments, ordering the United States to fund a trust for periodic disbursements rather than pay a reduced lump sum.
- Florida Statute § 768.78(2) permits either lump-sum (reduced to present value) or periodic payments (total equal to full future damages) and requires security (bond) if periodic payments are selected.
- Disputes on appeal: (1) whether the United States may obtain a reversionary interest in trust funds if E.R.T. dies early; (2) whether the district court properly declined to require a bond/security from the United States; (3) whether the government is entitled to interest/adjustment related to upfront lump funding of a periodic-payment trust; (4) timing of payment and payment schedule (including a $1M payment at 17½ years).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether periodic payments into a trust may be authorized without a bond or immediate full payment into court registry | Plaintiffs argued §768.78(2) requires posting bond/security or immediate full payment when periodic payments are used | United States argued the FTCA and federal status permit a tailored remedy: deposit into a trust and the government’s credit (or deposit) suffices as security | Court: Authorized trust funding and declined to require a separate bond given FTCA principles and unique federal debtor status; district court’s approach affirmed |
| Whether the United States is entitled to a reversionary interest in leftover periodic-payment funds if the claimant dies early | Plaintiffs argued no reversion; statute requires full payment to claimant regardless of early death | United States argued subsection (2) does not provide for continued payouts after death and comparison to subsection (1) permits reversion | Court: §768.78(2) unambiguously precludes a reversionary interest; district court correctly denied reversion to United States |
| Whether the United States is entitled, at claimant’s premature death, to (a) the difference between remaining trust balance and its present value and (b) interest earned solely because government funded full award up front | Plaintiffs opposed any crediting to government of such amounts | United States argued upfront lump funding puts it at a disadvantage compared to private periodic payor and it should receive equivalent credit/interest | Court: Reversed in part — United States is entitled to an interest in (1) the difference between full remaining balance and its present value at death and (2) interest earned solely because of the government’s upfront lump payment; remanded to quantify and adjust judgment |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in payment timing/schedule (including $1M at 17½ and 30-day post‑appeal payment deadline) | Plaintiffs supported the schedule and earlier payment scheduling to secure funds | United States argued payments should begin at age 20 (when working life would have begun) and that payment deadline improperly ignored further review/rehearing/ certiorari rights | Court: Payment schedule (including $1M at 17½ for housing preparations) was not an abuse of discretion; but district court erred in setting a 30-day post‑appeal decision payment deadline — United States entitled to stay/appeal protections, so deadline vacated and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Dutra v. United States, 478 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir.) (courts may craft remedies approximating results of state statutes under FTCA)
- United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (Supreme Court) (FTCA remedies and related principles)
- Lee v. United States, 765 F.3d 521 (5th Cir.) (FTCA application and remedy approximation)
- Sanders v. City of Orlando, 997 So. 2d 1089 (Fla.) (interpretation of mandatory statutory language "shall")
- Pruitt v. Perez‑Gervert, 41 So. 3d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (purpose of lost‑earning‑capacity awards)
- Lightfoot v. Walker, 797 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.) (discussing Rule 62 and stays without bond for the United States)