Marks v. Vanderventer
2015 IL 116226
Ill.2015Background
- Plaintiffs (Marks) filed a class action challenging a $10 Rental Housing Support Program surcharge collected by county recorders under 55 ILCS 5/3-5018, claiming it violated the Illinois Constitution.
- Original statute (2005) required a $10 surcharge: $9 sent to State for the Rental Housing Support Program and $1 retained by the county (50¢ of that earmarked for recorder office operations).
- Trial court granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment, holding the original statute created an unconstitutional "fee office" under Ill. Const. art. VII, § 9(a).
- Legislature amended the statute (effective Mar. 22, 2013) to recharacterize the charges: a $9 state surcharge remitted to the State and a separate $1 recordation fee retained locally (50¢ to county general fund, 50¢ to recorder automation fund). Plaintiffs amended their complaint challenging the $9 surcharge under due process and the uniformity clause.
- The trial court held the amended statute unconstitutional under due process and the uniformity clause; defendants appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fee-office prohibition (Art. VII, § 9(a)) | The $1 retained by counties amounted to an impermissible fee office or "skimming" of funds for local officer compensation/expenses. | The $1 is deposited with the county treasurer and allocated by statute (not retained by recorder as compensation); it is a legislative allocation, not an unlawful fee office or diversion of state funds. | Reversed trial court: no fee-office violation; recorder is a conduit and statute directs deposit and spending, so not an unconstitutional "skim." |
| Uniformity clause (Art. IX, § 2) | The $9 surcharge targets a narrow class (those recording real-estate documents) who do not uniquely cause or benefit from rental-housing problems; funding should be more broadly distributed. | The surcharge reasonably relates to legitimate legislative goals: those with real-estate interests reasonably benefit from stabilized property values and rental-market improvements. | Reversed trial court: classification bears a reasonable relationship to the statute's object; satisfies uniformity standard. |
| Substantive due process (Art. I, § 2) | The surcharge is arbitrary, irrational, and not reasonably related to legitimate government interests concerning housing stability and property values. | The surcharge rationally furthers legitimate interests (affordable housing, reduced vacancies, stabilized property values); rational-basis review applies. | Reversed trial court: statute survives rational-basis review; not a due-process violation. |
| Equal protection (Art. I, § 2) | (alternative challenge) surcharge unlawfully discriminates among taxpayers. | If statute satisfies the uniformity clause, it necessarily meets equal-protection requirements. | Court declined to decide separately; finding for uniformity disposes of equal-protection claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- DeBruyn v. Elrod, 84 Ill. 2d 128 (1981) (fee-office prohibition bars officers from retaining fees as compensation)
- Goldstein v. Rosewell, 65 Ill. 2d 325 (1976) (statute allowing county treasurers to retain a percentage of state taxes was an unlawful "skim")
- Schlessinger v. Olsen, 102 Ill. 2d 497 (1984) (diversion of tax revenues to collecting entity violates fee-office provision; diverted revenues must be returned)
- City of Joliet v. Bosworth, 64 Ill. 2d 516 (1976) (discusses prohibition on counties retaining portions of taxes imposed by other taxing bodies)
- Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142 (2003) (uniformity clause requires a real and substantial difference and a reasonable relationship to the tax's object)
- Grand Chapter, Order of the Eastern Star v. Topinka, 2015 IL 117083 (2015) (explains the limited inquiry for uniformity challenges and that perfect reciprocity between tax burden and benefit is not required)