Markovich v. Villere, 273 So. 3d 333

Samuel Markovich (commercial developer) and Diamond Properties owned/managed Mandeville properties; Code Enforcement Officer Christopher Brown issued warnings/citations for dumpster screening and permit violations at properties associated with Markovich.
Brown executed affidavits and summonses in mayor’s court; Markovich missed arraignments, contempt charges and arrest warrants issued; he was arrested at a zoning meeting in 2012.
City prosecutor nolle prossed the initial case for insufficient evidence, then reinstituted prosecution after additional information was provided; magistrate convicted Markovich on two counts but, after a trial de novo in district court, he was acquitted of all charges.
Markovich and Diamond sued Brown and Mayor Donald Villere for malicious prosecution, defamation, and tortious interference; defendants moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted dismissal of all claims with prejudice.
On appeal, the court reversed the summary judgment as to malicious prosecution (finding material factual disputes on probable cause and malice) and affirmed dismissal as to defamation and tortious interference (no proof of actionable injury or interference).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Malicious prosecution — did defendants lack probable cause and act with malice?	Markovich: prosecutions were unwarranted, charges pressed despite notice he didn’t own property, mayor’s involvement shows improper motive.	Brown/Villere: prosecutions followed investigative steps; prosecutor reinstituted charges after receiving additional information; some convictions occurred in mayor’s court; probable cause existed.	Reversed in part: summary judgment improper — genuine disputes exist on probable cause and malice for jury/trier of fact.
Defamation — did Brown publish false, defamatory statements causing injury?	Markovich: Brown told prospective tenants of code issues and disparaged Markovich, imputing criminality and harming reputation.	Brown: communications listed technical code violations to assist tenants; not criminal in nature and no evidence of resulting injury.	Affirmed: statements not defamatory per se; plaintiffs failed to prove damages causally connected to statements.
Tortious interference — did Brown improperly induce tenants not to deal with plaintiffs?	Markovich: Brown’s statements to new tenants disrupted business relationships.	Brown: no evidence any tenant declined to lease or that Brown prevented contracts; tenants proceeded with leases.	Affirmed: plaintiffs failed to show any actual interference or loss of business relations.

Lemoine v. Wolfe, 168 So.3d 362 (La. 2015) (outlines balance and limits on malicious prosecution under Louisiana law)
Jeansonne v. Bonano, 241 So.3d 1027 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2018) (elements required to prove malicious prosecution)
Miller v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Dept., 511 So.2d 446 (La. 1987) (verification may be required where information source is unworthy; malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause)
Costello v. Hardy, 864 So.2d 129 (La. 2003) (elements and standards for defamation, including defamation per se and proof of fault)