Markham v. Wolf
136 A.3d 134
Pa.2016Background
- Governor Wolf issued Executive Order 2015-05 establishing procedures and an advisory group for participant-directed home care, including a process for direct care workers to obtain a designated representative for meetings with the Department about wages and benefits.
- Petitioners (care recipients, workers, and provider associations) filed petitions in Commonwealth Court challenging the Executive Order as unauthorized and in conflict with Pennsylvania labor laws.
- Pennsylvania Senate Majority leaders (the Senate Majority Caucus) moved to intervene, claiming the Order usurped the Legislature’s lawmaking authority and violated separation of powers.
- Commonwealth Court denied the caucus’s motion to intervene (though allowed amicus participation), concluding the caucus’s asserted injury was a generalized grievance, not a unique legislative injury.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted expedited review to decide only whether the caucus had standing to intervene; it did not decide the Order’s constitutionality on the merits.
- The Supreme Court affirmed denial of intervention, holding legislative standing exists only when a legislator’s unique legislative prerogative (e.g., vote or exclusive statutory power) is directly impaired, which the caucus’s claims did not show.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Senate Majority Caucus has standing to intervene to challenge Executive Order 2015-05 as ultra vires | Caucus: the Order exercises lawmaking authority reserved to the Legislature and thus causes a cognizable institutional injury warranting intervention | Commonwealth/Governor: caucus only alleges generalized grievance about executive legality; no direct, immediate impairment of any unique legislative power | No — caucus lacks standing because its injury is generalized and does not directly impair its voting or unique legislative prerogatives |
| Whether alleged conflict with statutes (labor laws) gives legislators standing | Caucus: the Order creates organizational/labor rights without legislative authorization, denying legislators their chance to vote on such law | Appellees: statutory or constitutional disagreement is a generalized grievance; legislators can seek political remedies or pass statutes | No — statutory conflict alone does not confer legislative standing to intervene |
| Whether prior caselaw (Wilt, Fumo, Zemprelli) supports legislative standing here | Caucus: Fumo and related precedent permit legislative standing when executive usurps a power unique to legislature | Appellees: those cases limit standing to direct impairment of voting or exclusive statutory authority; here no such impairment occurred | Court: precedent permits standing only for direct/institutional injuries to legislative vote or exclusive powers; not present here |
| Whether allowing intervention would be unbounded and disruptive | Caucus: intervention appropriate to vindicate separation-of-powers and prevent executive lawmaking | Appellees/Court: recognizing standing here would allow legislators to litigate any alleged executive illegality and overwhelm courts; political remedies suffice | Court: declined to create such broad standing; permitted amicus participation instead |
Key Cases Cited
- William Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975) (standing requires that plaintiff be "aggrieved" with a real, concrete interest)
- Wilt v. Beal, 363 A.2d 876 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976) (legislators have standing when a specific power unique to their function, such as the effectiveness of a vote, is interfered with)
- Zemprelli v. Thornburgh, 407 A.2d 102 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) (standing where governor’s failure to submit nominations deprived senators of advice-and-consent function)
- Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165 (Pa. 1981) (legislators had standing where a challenge directly implicated the voting/confirmation process)
- Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2005) (rejects creation of a special category of legislative standing separate from ordinary standing rules)
- Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, 972 A.2d 487 (Pa. 2009) (legislative standing exists only for discernible and palpable infringements on legislative authority, e.g., usurpation of exclusive legislative power)
- Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (U.S. 1997) (members of Congress lack standing to assert institutional injuries when political remedies exist)
- Common Cause v. Commonwealth, 558 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming that generalized grievances about legislative process do not confer standing)