346 Conn. 277
Conn.2023Background
- Grace Farms owns a residential parcel subject to a 2017 special permit allowing a philanthropic institution, with condition 6 prohibiting any material change or intensification of use and condition 30 authorizing use of the former dwelling as an operations center.
- In 2018 Grace Farms obtained a zoning permit to convert space in the operations center into individual offices; a certificate of occupancy issued in June 2019.
- Plaintiffs appealed the zoning permit to the Zoning Board of Appeals alleging violations of conditions 6 and 30; the board denied the appeal and plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal in Superior Court (Nov. 2019).
- Proposed intervenors (abutting owners Curt and Bissonnette) filed and withdrew an initial motion to intervene in Dec. 2019; Grace Farms was permitted to intervene and the parties briefed and argued the case.
- The trial court (May 10, 2021) held the board had not decided whether the renovations were an impermissible intensification/change of use, remanded to the board for consultation with the Planning & Zoning Commission, and then the board began proceedings on remand (June 7, 2021).
- More than one week after the board’s remand meeting, the proposed intervenors filed a second motion to intervene; the trial court denied it as untimely and the denial was affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of motion to intervene as of right | Curt argued intervention was timely because their interests were first implicated when remand proceedings began | Opposing parties argued proposed intervenors knew of the administrative appeal from its filing and delayed unreasonably | Denied: trial court did not abuse discretion — motion untimely given knowledge from outset, long delay, and remand proceedings already underway |
| Measure timeliness from remand vs. appeal filing | Curt: legal interests arose only when board formulated questions on remand (June 7) | Others: abutters’ legal interest existed from the appeal's commencement; subjective delay irrelevant | Rejected: timeliness measured from when parties knew of appeal; abutters had a legal interest from inception |
| Consideration of hypothetical future administrative participation | Curt asked court to decide prospective issues about participation on remand | Opposing parties and court: no record that Curt requested or was denied participation on remand; ripeness and jurisdictional principles apply | Court declined to decide future hypotheticals; left room to renew intervention or other remedies if formally denied on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Austin-Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 81 A.3d 200 (Conn. 2013) (sets four-part test and timeliness factors for intervention)
- BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 990 A.2d 853 (Conn. 2010) (timeliness scrutiny increases as case progresses)
- Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 3 A.3d 892 (Conn. 2010) (defines abuse of discretion standard)
- Standard Petroleum Co. v. Faugno Acquisition, LLC, 191 A.3d 147 (Conn. 2018) (trial court discretion reviewed for permissible range)
- Hudson Valley Bank v. Kissel, 35 A.3d 260 (Conn. 2012) (untimely intervention of right is not automatically transformed into permissive intervention)
- In re Santiago G., 157 A.3d 60 (Conn. 2017) (colorable claim standard for appealability of intervention denial)
- West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council, 636 A.2d 1342 (Conn. 1994) (individual official statements do not equal formal collective decision)
- Piquet v. Chester, 49 A.3d 977 (Conn. 2012) (ripeness and exhaustion protect against premature adjudication)
- Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 822 A.2d 196 (Conn. 2003) (ripeness prevents courts from resolving hypothetical disputes)
