Mark Robbins v. Randy Becker, Sr.
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12934
| 8th Cir. | 2015Background
- Mark and Gail Robbins owned 1-44 Truck Center and provided towing/wrecker services along I-44; they were removed from MSHP rotation lists after a criminal charge against Mark (he was later acquitted).
- Missouri state court (2006) held MSHP lacked authority to maintain rotation lists and permanently enjoined MSHP from using such lists to determine towing operators.
- Robbinses sued 14 individual MSHP officers in federal court (2010) alleging §1983 due process and equal protection violations, a §1985 conspiracy, Sherman Act §§1–2 antitrust claims, and state-law claims; officers moved for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity and lack of actionable claims.
- After interlocutory appeal and remand for qualified-immunity analysis, the district court granted summary judgment to the officers on all federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims; Robbinses appealed.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it held Robbinses failed to show a cognizable property or liberty interest or conscience-shocking conduct for substantive due process, failed to show similarly situated comparators or intentional discrimination for equal protection, could not sustain a §1985 conspiracy absent an underlying constitutional violation, and presented no admissible evidence of a Sherman Act conspiracy or monopolization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Substantive due process (property/liberty interest) | Robbinses: officers deprived them of property interest in business expectancy and right to make a living by steering work away. | Officers: no protected property interest exists in discretionary towing referrals; no conscience-shocking conduct. | Held: No protected property or extinguished liberty interest; conduct not conscience-shocking — qualified immunity bars claim. |
| Equal protection (class-of-one) | Robbinses: treated differently than other tow companies without rational basis. | Officers: decisions are discretionary; Robbinses failed to identify proper similarly situated comparators or intentional discrimination. | Held: Even assuming claim cognizable, Robbinses failed to show similarly situated comparators or intentional/arbitrary discrimination. |
| §1985 conspiracy to violate constitutional rights | Robbinses: officers conspired to deprive constitutional rights via coordinated actions. | Officers: no underlying constitutional violation; conspiracy claim fails without it. | Held: Because constitutional claims fail, the §1985 conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law. |
| Sherman Act §§1–2 (antitrust conspiracy/monopolization) | Robbinses: officers and third-party tow companies conspired to restrain and monopolize interstate towing business. | Officers: no concerted action proven; Robbinses lack direct/circumstantial evidence of a meeting of minds or specific intent to monopolize. | Held: Summary judgment affirmed — Robbinses offered no competent evidence of an antitrust conspiracy or intent to monopolize. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2011) (summary-judgment review standard in §1983 actions)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified-immunity two-step analysis)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (flexibility in qualified-immunity sequencing)
- Habhab v. Hon, 536 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2008) (no protected property interest from towing-rotation list discretion)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (limits on class-of-one equal-protection claims where discretion is inherent)
- Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (recognition of class-of-one theory)
- Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (evidence required to infer conspiracy — conscious commitment to common scheme)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (conclusory conspiracy allegations insufficient)