Mark Robar v. Albert Robar
154 A.3d 947
| R.I. | 2017Background
- In July 2014 Mark Robar filed for a protection-from-abuse order against his father, Albert Robar, in Washington County Family Court.
- Temporary order issued; trial held January 26, 2015, where Mark alleged continuous stalking/harassment of him and his wife.
- Key facts: Mark saw Albert walking by his home on June 30, 2014 holding a cellphone as if recording; Mark’s wife testified she had been followed and lived in fear. Albert said he was walking to work and only held his phone to protect himself and never approached them.
- Family Court credited the wife’s fear and concluded the impression of recording placed plaintiff in fear; it entered a protection order effective until January 26, 2016.
- Albert appealed, arguing the Family Court’s findings were vague/irrelevant and that his conduct did not meet the statutory definition of domestic abuse.
- The Supreme Court summarily considered the appeal but dismissed it as moot because the protective order expired before decision; it declined to address the merits and remanded the record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness — whether the appeal remains justiciable after the order expired | Robar had a live controversy when order entered (implied) | Robar contended appeal should be decided despite expiration because the judgment could affect future proceedings | Court: Appeal is moot; expiration removed any practical effect, so merits not reached |
| Whether exception to mootness applies (capable of repetition/evades review or public importance) | Implied argument that controversy persists between family members | Albert argued potential use of judgment as evidence of pattern of harassment in future cases | Court: Declined exception; abstract possibility of future disputes insufficient to avoid mootness |
| Whether court should exercise discretion to review expired injunction because of collateral consequences | Plaintiff argued continuing stakes; not developed due to pro se default | Defendant sought review to clear record/validate Family Court decision | Court: Declined to exercise discretion; no practical effect now, so no review |
| Standard of review for injunction findings and sufficiency of evidence | N/A (merits not reached) | Argues Family Court erred; findings vague and insufficient under domestic-abuse statute | Court (observational): Even if reached, appellate standard is clear-error; defendant did not persuade court that Family Court misconceived or overlooked material evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Hallsmith-Sysco Food Services, LLC v. Marques, 970 A.2d 1211 (R.I. 2009) (mootness doctrine and when cases are deprived of a continuing stake)
- State v. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association, 941 A.2d 219 (R.I. 2008) (definition of mootness where events after filing remove justiciable controversy)
- Cicilline v. Almond, 809 A.2d 1101 (R.I. 2002) (noting courts generally decline to address moot cases)
- City of Cranston v. Rhode Island Laborers’ District Council Local 1033, 960 A.2d 529 (R.I. 2008) (practical-effect test for mootness and exceptions)
- Cullen v. Tarini, 15 A.3d 968 (R.I. 2011) (standard of review for injunctions: overturn only if findings clearly wrong or material evidence overlooked)
- Board of Governors for Higher Education v. Infinity Construction Services, Inc., 795 A.2d 1127 (R.I. 2002) (same standard for appellate review of factual findings)
- Morris v. D’Amario, 416 A.2d 137 (R.I. 1980) (mootness principle cited for declining to render opinion when judgment would have no practical effect)