Mark Luke v. State, 03-17-00019-CR

Mark Luke pleaded guilty (2015) to driving while intoxicated with a child passenger; sentence of 2 years in state jail was suspended and he was placed on 5 years community supervision.
As part of a plea agreement/modification, the court ordered Luke to complete a 45–120 day Intermediate Sanctions Facility (ISF) program (a combined substance-abuse cognitive track) and stay in jail until transported.
After preparing admission paperwork, Luke’s supervision officer (Clark) discovered the ISF program had been restructured into two separate tracks (cognitive and substance-abuse) such that completing both would take up to 180 days, so Clark drafted a modified order reflecting the available program.
Clark presented the modified order to Luke in jail; Luke refused to sign and, nearly a month later, the State moved to revoke Luke’s supervision for failing to cooperate with/complete ISF requirements.
At the revocation hearing, the court found Luke violated supervision, offered alternatives, Luke chose revocation and an 18‑month state jail sentence (reduced from 2 years); Luke appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Luke)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the court abused its discretion by finding Luke violated supervision because the supervision officer "unilaterally" modified conditions without authorization or required procedures.	Officer lacked authority and failed to follow article 42.12 §10(e) procedures; modified terms were therefore illegal.	The officer acted only to reflect that the originally-ordered program no longer existed; the court retained authority to modify/resolve and was not deprived of a hearing.	No abuse of discretion; court properly found violation.
Whether evidence was insufficient to prove Luke violated the ISF completion requirement.	The State proved nothing that Luke failed to complete the court-ordered 45–120 day program as written.	Clark testified the original combined track no longer existed, he presented the only available program to Luke, who refused to cooperate or sign admission — supporting failure to cooperate/complete.	Evidence (Clark’s testimony) was sufficient by preponderance to support revocation.

Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (revocation requires proof by preponderance; trial court’s credibility determinations deferential)
Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (view evidence in light most favorable to revocation finding)
Witkovsky v. State, 320 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010) (requirements for transferring defendant to a different program and procedural protections under article 42.12)
Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (definition of preponderance of the evidence in probation-revocation context)