Mark Leonard v. State of Indiana
2017 Ind. LEXIS 337
| Ind. | 2017Background
- On November 10, 2012 a deliberate natural-gas explosion destroyed multiple homes in an Indianapolis subdivision; two neighbors (Dion and Jennifer Longworth) died from blast/thermal injuries.
- Mark Leonard lived with homeowner Monserrate Shirley and, according to Shirley’s cooperation, planned and executed an insurance-fraud scheme to destroy Shirley’s house by intentionally introducing natural gas and a delayed ignition device.
- Investigators concluded the fireplace/flue had been modified to let gas fill the house, a timing device produced a delayed ignition, and the blast was equivalent to about three tons of TNT.
- Leonard was charged in a multi-count information (including two murder counts); after trial the jury convicted him on all counts and the court (after Leonard waived a jury for sentencing) found three aggravators and imposed consecutive life-without-parole terms for the two murders plus additional consecutive terms.
- On direct appeal Leonard challenged (1) sufficiency of the evidence for murder/knowing mens rea as to the specific victims, (2) proof of the (b)(11) aggravator (burned/mutilated/tortured), (3) admission of recorded post-charge statements (alleged Sixth Amendment violation), and (4) constitutionality of Indiana’s life without parole statute.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Leonard's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency: Was there proof Leonard "knowingly" killed the Longworths? | Circumstantial evidence (planning, gas research, blocked flue, thermostat alteration, comments about explosion and insurance, proximity of houses) supported inference he knew death was highly probable. | State failed to prove he was aware he would kill those specific neighbors; mens rea must apply to each element and victim identity. | Affirmed: Evidence sufficient; "knowingly" may be inferred from conduct and circumstances; identity need not be knowingly targeted. |
| Aggravator (I.C. § 35-50-2-9(b)(11)): Must State prove defendant intentionally burned victim? | The statutory word "burned" does not require proof of specific intent to burn a person; if death by burning occurred as a direct result of defendant’s explosive-caused fire, (b)(11) is met. | Nicholson requires intent for "torture" and similar intent should be read into "burned." | Affirmed: (b)(11) proven beyond reasonable doubt; intent need not be read into "burned." |
| Admission of post-charge statements (Sixth Amendment): Were recorded jail calls to an undercover agent admissible? | Sixth Amendment is offense-specific; calls about an uncharged murder-for-hire plot were not protected by counsel attachment for the explosion case (Texas v. Cobb); admission proper. | Calls were deliberately elicited after charges and after right to counsel attached on the explosion case, so they were protected and inadmissible. | Affirmed: Admission proper under offense-specific Sixth Amendment rule; no violation. |
| Constitutionality of Indiana LWOP statute: Must weighing of aggravators vs mitigators be found beyond a reasonable doubt / by jury? | Existing Indiana precedent controls: weighing is a balancing (not a "fact"), no reasonable-doubt requirement; Hurst does not change that result in this LWOP context. | Hurst requires jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt for capital facts; thus Indiana must require jury or beyond-RB standard for LWOP weighing. | Affirmed: Statute constitutional as applied; Hurst did not mandate revisiting Indiana precedent and weighing need not be found beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Key Cases Cited
- Soward v. State, 716 N.E.2d 423 (Ind. 1999) (standard for sufficiency review)
- Kelly v. State, 719 N.E.2d 391 (Ind. 1999) (probative-evidence standard for affirming verdict)
- Young v. State, 761 N.E.2d 387 (Ind. 2002) (definition of "knowingly" and inference discussion)
- Nicholson v. State, 768 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 2002) (torture aggravator requires intent; distinguished here)
- Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. 1995) (fire-starting cases sustaining knowing murder convictions)
- Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (U.S. 2001) (Sixth Amendment is offense-specific; statements about uncharged offenses admissible)
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016) (capital sentencing: jury must find facts necessary for death; court explains limits but did not dictate LWOP balancing rule)
- Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469 (Ind. 2015) (Indiana precedent holding weighing aggravators vs mitigators is not a fact requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt)