Mark Lee v. Smith & Wesson Corporation
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14393
| 6th Cir. | 2014Background
- Plaintiff Mark Lee was injured when Smith & Wesson’s revolver discharged during a third shot; Lee alleges manufacturing/design/warnings defects and nonconformity with representations.
- Expert Roy Ruel concluded the gun could fire with the cylinder not fully closed, due to ejector-rod looseness and a hot-gas release; his theory relied on physical evidence from the revolver.
- The district court excluded Ruel’s testimony under Rule 702/Daubert due to alleged inconsistencies with Lee’s memory.
- The Lees stipulated to dismiss their state case and appealed the district court’s evidentiary ruling; the court remanded for further proceedings.
- The majority reverses, holding Ruel’s testimony should have been admitted; Greenwell v. Boatwright is cited to distinguish admissibility when expert theory relies on physical evidence.
- Dissent would have affirmed exclusion as a gatekeeping failure to fit the facts; the majority’s view disputes this and remands for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Ruel’s testimony despite memory conflict | Lee’s memory consistent with physical evidence; expert theory grounded in evidence. | testimony contradicted Lee; fails Daubert fit and Rule 702. | Admissible; exclusion reversed |
| Whether Ruel’s theory fits the facts of the case | Theory relies on physical evidence and could explain the accident even if Lee erred. | Theory does not fit the factual record as memory and demonstration show closed cylinder. | Yes, it fits sufficiently; district court erred |
| Whether Lee’s deposition constitutes a judicial admission undermining admissibility | Lee’s memory testimony is not a judicial admission; he can testify truthfully. | Lee’s statements could be judicial admissions under Greenwell logic. | Lee’s testimony is not a judicial admission |
| Role of Greenwell precedent in admissibility | Greenwell supports admitting expert testimony based on physical evidence even if eyewitness testimony differs. | Greenwell does not compel admission when facts contradict evidence. | Greenwell supports, but the holding is that admissibility depends on fit |
Key Cases Cited
- Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492 (6th Cir.1999) (admits expert testimony based on physical evidence despite conflicting eyewitness testimony)
- United States v. LeBlanc, 45 Fed.Appx. 393 (6th Cir.2002) (relevancy and Daubert fit when expert theory relies on physical evidence)
- Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 138 Fed.Appx. 804 (6th Cir.2005) (excluded expert where relied on questionable data/estimates)
- Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566 (6th Cir.2000) (fit and reliability; laboratory tests and opposing expert testimony affect admissibility)
- General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (Supreme Court, 1997) (Daubert requires a gap-free connection between data and opinion)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (Supreme Court, 1993) (gatekeeping test for expert testimony)