Mark Lee Dickson and Right to Life East Texas v. the Afiya Center and Texas Equal Access Fund, 650 S.W.3d 513

Appellants Mark Lee Dickson and Right to Life East Texas (RLET) advocated for and helped draft a Waskom, Texas ordinance declaring abortion illegal and listing abortion providers/advocacy groups as "criminal organizations."
Dickson and RLET published social‑media posts and gave interviews characterizing abortion as "murder" and asserting the named organizations engaged in criminal activity.
The Afiya Center and Texas Equal Access Fund sued for defamation and civil conspiracy, seeking actual and punitive damages.
The trial court denied defendants’ Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss; defendants appealed. A separate Texas appellate panel (Amarillo) held similar speech fell within the TCPA and should be dismissed.
Justice Schenck’s dissent (from denial of en banc reconsideration) argues the statements are rhetorical hyperbole/opinion on public matters, are protected by the First Amendment and TCPA, and the case should be dismissed with fees to avoid chilling political speech.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability of TCPA to speech at issue	Dickson’s statements are factual accusations (criminal conduct) and not protected political speech	Statements are opinion/rhetorical hyperbole on a public issue and fall within TCPA protection	Panel denied TCPA dismissal; dissent would apply TCPA and reverse
Fact vs. opinion/rhetorical hyperbole	Calling organizations "criminal" asserts provable factual wrongdoing	Characterizations like "abortion is murder" are opinion/rhetorical hyperbole and not actionable	Panel treated statements as factual for trial; dissent says court should rule they are opinion as a matter of law
First Amendment constraint on common‑law defamation	Common‑law defamation can award damages for false factual statements, even between private parties	Using tort law to punish political speech risks unconstitutional chilling; courts must guard against that constraint	Dissent emphasizes federal/state constitutional limits; panel allowed case to proceed
Who decides liability (court or jury) under TCPA/defamation	Plaintiffs: jury should resolve disputed factual issues	Defendants: court must assess TCPA threshold and decide protected speech questions to avoid chilling effects	Panel left factual issues for jury; dissent urges appellate/court determination and prompt dismissal

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (recognition of privacy right and limits on adjudicating when life begins)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (protects criticism of public affairs from state law suppression)
Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (political rhetoric on public issues warrants First Amendment protection)
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (distinguishing opinion/rhetorical hyperbole from actionable factual assertions)
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (scope of injunctions limiting speech near clinics)
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (appellate courts’ independent review in First Amendment contexts)
In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (TCPA’s purpose to quickly dispose suits that chill First Amendment rights)
Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. 2002) (First Amendment protects rhetorical hyperbole in public‑issue debate)
Scripps NP Operating, LLC v. Carter, 573 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. 2019) (defamation standards and opinion analysis)
Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1989) (whether statement is fact or opinion is a question of law for the court)