Mark Lavin v. West Corporation
CA 2017-0547-JRS
| Del. Ch. | Dec 29, 2017Background
- West Corp. ran a formal sale process (2016–May 2017) and signed a merger agreement with Apollo for $23.50/share; stockholders approved the deal (~99.8% of votes cast) and the merger closed later in 2017.
- Shareholder Mark Lavin served a Section 220 demand (July 19, 2017) seeking documents to investigate alleged wrongdoing in the sale process and the independence/disinterestedness of directors; West refused as overbroad and lacking a proper purpose.
- Key factual allegations supporting Lavin’s demand: (i) multiple bidders made sizable offers for individual West business segments (suggesting a potentially more valuable break-up sale); (ii) private equity sponsors TH Lee and Quadrangle retained contractual director-designation rights and were liquidating positions; (iii) management and directors (including CEO Barker) had significant deal-related compensation (golden parachutes); (iv) Centerview had a contingent fee that could create conflicts.
- Lavin filed a Verified Complaint to compel inspection; the court tried the Section 220 action on a paper record and applied the low “credible basis” standard for inspection demands.
- The Court of Chancery held that Lavin met the Section 220 credible-basis threshold to infer possible breaches of fiduciary duties (including Revlon-related concerns and conflicts) and ordered production, but narrowly tailored the scope and time period (Jan 1, 2016–July 26, 2017).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Corwin bars Section 220 inspection by cleansing alleged fiduciary breaches because disinterested, informed stockholders approved the merger | Lavin argued he needs documents to plead around a future Corwin defense and to determine whether the vote was fully informed or coerced | West argued Corwin applies now: a fully informed, uncoerced vote by disinterested stockholders triggers business-judgment rule and defeats inspection seeking process-related proof | Court: Corwin does not bar a properly supported Section 220 demand; refusing inspection on Corwin grounds would improperly require merits-stage adjudication in a summary inspection proceeding |
| Whether Lavin showed a "credible basis" to suspect wrongdoing to justify inspection | Lavin relied on evidence of segment bids, board/PE sponsor ties, management deal incentives, and advisor contingent fees as “some evidence” of conflicted process favoring a whole-company sale | West contended Lavin’s claims were speculative and that public disclosures (Proxy) demonstrate a fair, informed process | Court: Lavin met the low Section 220 credible-basis standard — presented sufficient evidence to infer possible Revlon/conflict-driven misconduct and to investigate director independence |
| Whether investigating director independence is a proper purpose under §220 | Lavin sought documents (disclosure questionnaires, communications) to test whether PE sponsors effectively controlled the board | West argued independence claims were waived or insufficient | Court: Investigating director independence is a proper purpose; Lavin showed a credible basis to question whether TH Lee/Quadrangle controlled half the board |
| Scope and tailoring of production | Lavin sought broad categories (13 categories) of documents to pursue his purposes and to prepare potential litigation | West argued the request was overbroad and sought irrelevant/materially cumulative items | Court: Ordered targeted production limited to documents "necessary and essential" to Lavin’s purposes (sum-of-the-parts analyses, indications of interest/offers, relevant board minutes, communications between key executives/directors and bidders/advisors, and materials on director independence) for Jan 1, 2016–July 26, 2017 |
Key Cases Cited
- Corwin v. KKR Fin. Hldgs. LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) (stockholder vote can invoke business-judgment review when fully informed and uncoerced)
- Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117 (Del. 2006) (credible-basis standard for §220; inspection to investigate wrongdoing is a proper purpose)
- Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026 (Del. 1996) (§220 requires each category requested be necessary and sufficient to stated purpose)
- Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752 (Del. Ch. 2016) (ordering targeted electronic document production in §220; investigating director relationships and independence can be proper)
- In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012) (board’s failure to consider break-up value can be relevant to Revlon duties)
- In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S'holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007) (evidence that board steered process consistent with directors’ incentives supports breach of fiduciary duty claims)
