Mark J Kollar v. Briana Sparks
364420
Mich. Ct. App.Oct 26, 2023Background
- Plaintiff Mark J. Kollar was the presumed father of AJK (born April 2021 to Briana Sparks); Sparks later had a DNA test showing Jordan Lewis was the biological father.
- Lewis intervened and moved to revoke Kollar’s paternity under the Revocation of Paternity Act (ROPA); a referee conducted a multi-day evidentiary hearing.
- The referee recommended, and the trial court ordered after a de novo hearing, that AJK be declared born out of wedlock and revoked Kollar’s paternity based on a best-interests analysis.
- The Friend of the Court investigator Angie Sattler testified as an expert and submitted a report; Kollar objected to her qualification and the report’s admission.
- Kollar raised multiple due-process complaints (early parenting time to Lewis, closing the custody case, limits on new evidence at the de novo hearing, alleged judicial bias) and sought sanctions against Lewis’s counsel.
- The trial court denied relief on those claims; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qualification of FOC investigator (Angie Sattler) as expert | Sattler lacked paternity/ROPA experience and was unqualified to offer expert testimony on issues bearing on the paternity revocation. | Sattler had extensive FOC investigative, counseling, and custody-experience; her opinions assisted the factfinder on best-interest issues relevant to ROPA. | Court: referee did not abuse discretion qualifying Sattler for child-custody investigation opinion; any deficiency affected weight, not admissibility. |
| Admission of Sattler’s investigative report | Report was hearsay and inadmissible; its admission prejudiced Kollar. | Even if report admission was error, Sattler’s live testimony and the referee’s independent review rendered any error harmless. | Court: admission was erroneous but harmless; no relief warranted. |
| Interim parenting time to Lewis before final paternity ruling | Granting Lewis parenting time before final ROPA resolution violated Kollar’s due-process/parental rights. | Statutory scheme and best-interests authority permit interim parenting time; Kollar had notice and opportunity to be heard. | Court: no due-process violation—trial court balanced competing interests, gave notice, and acted under statutes to protect child’s best interests. |
| Closing the custody case and limits on de novo evidence/new witnesses | Closing the custody case deprived Kollar of standing and the ability to delay custody resolution; refusal to admit new witnesses at de novo hearing violated his right to present evidence. | Once paternity was revoked, Kollar ceased to be legal father and had no basis to keep the original custody case open; trial court properly limited de novo new evidence to disputed findings. | Court: closure was appropriate after paternity determination; trial court did not abuse discretion in limiting new evidence; Kollar failed to preserve arguments about specific new testimony. |
| Judicial bias and sanctions against opposing counsel | Trial judge displayed bias and the court should have sanctioned Lewis’s lawyer for misrepresentations in an emergency motion. | Rulings reflect reasoned balancing, not bias; Kollar failed to identify a proper basis or preserved record for sanctions. | Court: no demonstration of judicial bias; sanctions claim abandoned for lack of developed argument and record. |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (parents have fundamental right to make decisions concerning their children)
- Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (U.S. 1989) (conflict between presumed husband’s rights and biological father is a matter of state policy)
- Bonner v. Brighton, 495 Mich. 209 (Mich. 2014) (due-process analysis for parental-rights disputes)
- Hunter v. Hunter, 484 Mich. 247 (Mich. 2009) (special weight to fit parent’s decision in custody disputes)
- Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams, 302 Mich. App. 521 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (ROPA standing and alleged-father limitations)
- Carson Fischer Potts & Hyman v. Hyman, 220 Mich. App. 116 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (expert may not testify on legal conclusions; expert may address ultimate facts)
- Cain v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 451 Mich. 470 (Mich. 1996) (presumption of judicial impartiality)
- Gay v. Select Specialty Hosp., 295 Mich. App. 284 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (standard for qualifying expert testimony)
- Mitchell v. Kalamazoo Anesthesiology, P.C., 321 Mich. App. 144 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)