Mark Gekas v. Peter Vasiliades, 814 F.3d 890

Mark Gekas, a licensed dentist, sued five individual members of the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation tied to events dating back to 1988 and retaliatory actions taken in 2004.
In 1988 Gekas complained to the Deputy Governor about a Department investigator; no further conflict occurred until 2002–2004, when the Department investigated Gekas, raided his office, and in June 2004 issued a cease-and-desist order and an administrative complaint alleging unlicensed medical practice and improper prescribing to a patient (K.Y.).
Gekas challenged the 2004 actions administratively and in state court; the 2004 cease-and-desist order was vacated in October 2008 and declared null and void by agreement in December 2008.
Gekas filed a federal suit in March 2010 asserting that the 2004 actions were retaliation for his 1988 communications with the Deputy Governor; he also pointed to later contacts with a state senator and a 2009 FOIA request, but limited his appeal to causation for the 2004 actions.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, assuming protected speech and an adverse action but finding no evidence of retaliatory motive; the Seventh Circuit affirms, concluding Gekas’ § 1983 claims are time-barred and, alternatively, lack evidence of causation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness (statute of limitations)	Gekas argued retaliation accrued when the administrative proceedings concluded favorably (2008), so his 2010 suit is timely	§ 1983 claims accrue when plaintiff knows of the violation; two-year Illinois limitations applies, so 2004 acts required suit by 2006	Claims are time-barred; accrual occurred at the 2004 actions, not 2008 vacatur
Causation / Retaliatory motive for 2004 actions	Circumstantial inference: 1988 complaint to Deputy Governor motivated 2004 cease-and-desist and complaint; likened claim to malicious/retaliatory prosecution	Defendants showed the 2004 actions were taken for legitimate regulatory reasons (improper prescribing); plaintiff produced no non-speculative evidence tying defendants to retaliatory motive	Even on the merits, plaintiff failed to show any defendant acted with retaliatory motive; summary judgment proper

Dawson v. Brown, 803 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2015) (summary judgment standard and limits on speculative inferences)
Draper v. Martin, 664 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2011) (Illinois two-year statute of limitations for § 1983)
Jenkins v. Village of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2007) (limitations in § 1983 actions)
Hileman v. Maze, 367 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2004) (accrual rule: when plaintiff knows or should know of constitutional violation)
Mosely v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006) (retaliation claims accrue at time of retaliatory act)
Northern v. City of Chicago, 126 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1997) (timeliness of First Amendment retaliation claims)
Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2010) (tolling/accrual analogies to malicious prosecution analyzed)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (favorable-termination rule for claims challenging convictions)
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (accrual rules for claims connected to criminal prosecution)
Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff need not await vacation of administrative action to sue where claim does not impugn validity)
Santana v. Cook County Board of Review, 679 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2012) (elements of First Amendment retaliation claim)
Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2013) (speculation insufficient to create genuine issue on retaliatory motive)
Johnson v. Cambridge Industries, Inc., 325 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2003) (summary judgment is the 'put up or shut up' moment)