Mark Fruge v. State
03-14-00724-CR
| Tex. App. | Aug 10, 2015Background
- Mark Fruge was tried in Travis County for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault of a public servant; convicted and sentenced to life; appealed.
- At trial, store employees identified Fruge as the Fallas Discount robber who fired rounds into the register area; officers pursued a vehicle, shots were exchanged, and an APD officer was wounded.
- Police recovered a Glock and a magazine bearing Fruge’s name and address; Fruge was later arrested at an apartment complex.
- During jury selection the State moved to strike veniremember Jason Samaniego-Krant for cause based on comments that he needed to be "100 percent certain" before convicting; the trial court granted the challenge.
- During guilt/innocence the State elicited testimony and showed photos regarding an alleged car-jacking/abduction that occurred during Fruge’s flight; Fruge objected as improper extraneous-offense evidence under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403, but the court admitted it.
- Appellant’s brief raises two principal appellate complaints: (1) erroneous grant of the State’s challenge for cause, depriving Fruge of an impartial jury, and (2) erroneous admission of an extraneous offense (the car-jacking) that was more prejudicial than probative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Fruge) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's challenge for cause to veniremember Samaniego-Krant | The veniremember expressed uncertainty and used "100 percent" language, indicating he could not follow the law's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, so challenge for cause was proper | The juror ultimately said he would hold the State to its burden and follow the law; asking for "100 percent" reflected his personal caution, not inability to apply the legal standard; excusal applied a higher-than-required threshold | The brief argues the court applied the wrong standard and improperly excused a juror who could follow the law (requests reversal citing Gray v. Mississippi) |
| Whether admission of testimony/photos about an alleged car-jacking (extraneous offense) was improper | The State claimed the episode was admissible as contextual evidence of flight/same-transaction context and probative to link events during Fruge’s escape | Fruge argues the charged-offense evidence and capture were already fully explained without the car-jacking; the extraneous event was irrelevant to the charged offenses and served only to show bad character, making it inadmissible under Rule 404(b) and unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 | The brief contends the admission was erroneous and not harmless; seeks reversal and new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) (erroneous removal for cause of juror who was not substantially impaired can require reversal without harmless-error analysis)
- Uttecht v. Washington, 551 U.S. 1 (2007) (deference to trial-court juror-bias determinations in capital cases)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (standard for excusing jurors for cause when views would prevent jury service in accordance with law)
- Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (reviewing courts defer to trial judge's demeanor-based rulings on juror bias; proponent bears burden to show venireman cannot follow law)
- Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (jurors may form individual definitions of "beyond a reasonable doubt" and are not challengeable for cause based solely on differing thresholds)
- Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (trial courts not required to define reasonable doubt; constitution neither requires nor forbids such definitions)
- Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (on rehearing) (framework for admitting extraneous-offense evidence: relevance apart from character conformity, then Rule 403 balancing)
- Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (same-transaction contextual evidence admissible only if necessary to jury's understanding of the charged offense)
