Mark Edward Campbell v. Misty McDaniel Campbell, 269 So. 3d 426

Mark and Misty Campbell divorced by consent; their property-settlement and child-custody agreement (incorporated into the final judgment) required Mark to pay $1,250 per month per child until each child reached age 21, married, joined the armed forces, or was otherwise emancipated.
The agreement also provided substantial lump-sum alimony and other ongoing financial obligations by Mark (insurance, private school, college, etc.).
Years later Mark filed to modify support, alleging (1) one child became emancipated and (2) his income had substantially decreased; he also raised (and later abandoned) abuse/neglect and custody allegations against Misty.
Misty counterclaimed for contempt and sought increased support; a guardian ad litem (GAL) was appointed after Mark’s allegations, and Mark was ordered to pay a GAL retainer which he failed to timely pay.
The chancery court found Mark willfully in contempt for unpaid support and GAL fees, concluded the enlistment/emancipation of one child justified modification, determined Mark’s income remained high, increased child support to $8,050/month, and awarded Misty $4,141.97 in attorney’s fees for defending against the abuse/neglect claims.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the upward child-support modification (holding the agreement anticipated enlistment) and reversed the attorney-fee award in part, remanding for the chancellor to segregate fees attributable to defending the unsubstantiated abuse/neglect claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mark)	Defendant's Argument (Misty)	Held
Whether enlistment/emancipation of a child justified upward modification of child support	Enlistment of the second-oldest son constituted emancipation and a material change warranting recalculation under statutory guidelines	The parties’ written agreement explicitly contemplated emancipation by enlistment; therefore the event was not unanticipated and should not justify modification	Reversed: Enlistment was contemplated by the agreement; chancellor erred. Restored agreed $1,250 per child obligation and ordered credit for any excess paid.
Whether chancellor properly awarded attorney’s fees to Misty for defending abuse/neglect claims	Award was improper because fees were not segregated between defense of abuse/neglect claims and other disputes; Mark should not be ordered to pay non-attributable fees	Chancery court awarded fees under statutory authority after finding Mark’s abuse/neglect allegations unsubstantiated	Reversed in part and remanded: Chancellor abused discretion by not separating fees; must determine which fees were incurred defending the unsubstantiated claims before awarding.

Strait v. Lorenz, 155 So. 3d 197 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (standard of appellate review for chancery findings)
In re C.T., 228 So. 3d 311 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (modification requires substantial material change arising after decree)
Davis v. Davis, 222 So. 3d 1101 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (change must be unforeseen at time of agreement)
Corkern v. Corkern, 58 So. 3d 1229 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (same principle regarding unforeseen circumstances)
Evans v. Evans, 75 So. 3d 1083 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (discretionary nature of attorney-fee awards)
McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1982) (chancellor’s discretion on fee awards)
Ewing v. Ewing, 203 So. 3d 707 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (need to consider ability to pay when awarding attorney’s fees)
Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So. 2d 770 (Miss. 1997) (generally require showing of inability to pay before awarding fees)