Mark A. Campbell v. Judy P. Smith
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 20064
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Campbell pleaded guilty in Wisconsin state court to first-degree sexual assault of a child, involving his ten-year-old daughter.
- Plea agreement: three other counts dismissed; State agreed to recommend no more than 20 years total, with 5–7 years initial confinement and the balance as extended supervision.
- Presentence reports consistently recommended 20–40 years initial confinement and 7–10 years extended supervision.
- At resentencing, the prosecutor argued factors favoring a lengthy sentence; defense counsel did not object and instead reiterated the plea terms.
- The court sentenced Campbell to 44 years total (34 years initial confinement, 10 years extended supervision).
- Campbell sought postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the prosecutor’s remarks and to the omission of the initial confinement recommendation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the prosecutor materially breach the plea agreement by omitting the five-to-seven year confinement recommendation? | Campbell argues breach of plea terms by omission and by related framing of the sentencing. | State contends the omission was insubstantial and not a material breach. | No material and substantial breach; permissible under Santobello. |
| Did the resentencing remarks undermine the plea agreement? | Campbell contends remarks undermined the bargaining and violated the plea. | State argues remarks did not undermine the plea and served proper sentencing factors. | Not a material breach; overall not prejudicial. |
| Was counsel's failure to object ineffective assistance under Strickland? | Campbell asserts counsel was ineffective for not objecting to breach-like conduct and omissions. | State asserts no effective breach and thus no basis for Strickland prejudice. | No deficient performance or prejudice; counsel's actions were reasonable. |
| Was the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' application of Santobello/Strickland reasonable under AEDPA? | Campbell contends unreasonable application of clearly established law. | State maintains the decision was reasonable and adequately supported by record evidence. | Not unreasonable; decision affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (plea promises must be fulfilled; breach actionable if material)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance)
- Diaz-Jiminez v. United States, 622 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (insubstantial breach may yield no relief)
- Hartjes v. Endicott, 456 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2006) (non-curative or immaterial breaches may be harmless)
- United States v. Hauptman, 111 F.3d 48 (7th Cir. 1997) (breach remedies depend on materiality)
- United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453 (1985) (prosecutorial discretion in sentencing arguments)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (breach-related prejudice is not guaranteed; assess actual sentence impact)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (unreasonableness standard for federal habeas review under AEDPA)
- White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014) (requires deference to state court factual determinations)
- Salazar v. United States, 453 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2006) (sentencing arguments within permissible range; balance with plea)