Marjorie Tramp v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 768 F.3d 793

Tramp was hired in 2000 by Associated Underwriters; in 2007 a reduction-in-force occurred, with Gurbacki deciding who was terminated, and Tramp remained employed despite performance concerns.
In mid-2008 health-insurance premium costs prompted management to consider reductions; emails show discussions tying premiums to older employees, including Tramp, and consideration of Medicare alternatives.
In October 2008 Tramp received a formal written reprimand and a 90-day probation for performance issues; probation ended January 2009.
In February 2009, a second RIF terminated Tramp along with three other employees; her work duties were redistributed among remaining staff, none of whom were over 65.
Tramp alleged age discrimination under ADEA and disability discrimination under ADA, asserting a pretextual termination tied to age or disability, including a one-day timing gap before knee-surgery.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ADA claim and on the ADEA claim, applying Hazen Paper and concluding health-care cost concerns were analytically distinct from age.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Tramp's ADEA claim survives summary judgment	Age was the but-for cause in termination.	Costs tied to health care are analytically distinct from age; performance and RIF rationale justify termination.	Issue remains factual; not resolved at summary judgment
Whether the ADA claim survives summary judgment	Tramp was perceived as disabled and terminated because of knee surgery, implying disability-based discrimination.	No evidence decisionmakers knew of a disability or acted because of it; timing alone insufficient; cat's paw not shown.	ADA claim dismissed
Whether evidence raises a genuine dispute about pretext in ADEA claim	Emails and timing suggest discriminatory intent against older employees in the context of health-cost concerns.	Evidence could reflect non-discriminatory cost concerns; timing gaps undermine but-for causation.	Limited dispute; remand for fact-finder to resolve

Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (Supreme Court, 1993) (age as a proxy must be distinct from other factors where possible)
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (Supreme Court, 2009) (but-for causation required; age must be the determining factor)
EEOC v. City of Independence, Mo., 471 F.3d 891 (Eighth Cir., 2006) (employer's assumptions about age can be considered in context)
Tusing v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 639 F.3d 507 (Eighth Cir., 2011) (pretext framework in ADEA cases; age discrimination requires real motive)
Stewart v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034 (Eighth Cir., 2007) (temporal proximity considerations in retaliation claims)
Nyrop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 616 F.3d 728 (Eighth Cir., 2010) (temporal proximity and evidence weight considerations)
Kozisek v. County of Seward, Neb., 539 F.3d 930 (Eighth Cir., 2008) (awareness and knowledge of disability as a requirement)
Robinson v. American Red Cross, 753 F.3d 749 (Eighth Cir., 2014) (summary judgment standard and burden shifting in ADA/ADEA contexts)