Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch Partnership, 2011 UT 50

Marion Energy and the Trust seek to condemn about 15 acres of KFJ Ranch land to build a four-mile road to access their oil and gas deposits beneath KFJ-owned surface lands.
The condemnation relies on Utah Code section 78B-6-501(6)(a), which authorizes eminent domain for roads to facilitate the working of mineral deposits.
KFJ owns ~9,400 acres total, with ~6,600 in fee and ~2,800 leased from the state/federal governments; Marion leases two deposits beneath KFJ property.
KFJ refused Marion’s requests for an easement to cross its land; Marion and the Trust filed suit in district court.
The district court granted KFJ’s motion to dismiss, finding 501(6)(a) does not authorize condemnation to access oil and gas.”
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether the term “mineral deposits” in 501(6)(a) includes oil and gas, deciding the term is ambiguous and must be construed strictly against the condemning party.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does section 78B-6-501(6)(a) authorize condemnation to access oil and gas?	Marion/Trust argue that “mineral deposits” includes oil and gas under the statute.	KFJ argues the phrase is ambiguous and should be read to exclude oil and gas.	Statute is ambiguous; ambiguity resolved against Marion.

Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626 ( Utah 1950) (strict construction of eminent domain acts against condemners)
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consolidated Mines Co., 174 P. at 172 (Utah 1918) (liberal construction for purpose when right of eminent domain granted for a specific objective)
Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 31 P.2d 624 ( Utah 1934) (liberal construction of eminent domain statutes to carry out legislative purpose)
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2004) (contextual approach to interpreting terms like ‘mineral’)