Mario Naranjo v. Bobby Thompson
809 F.3d 793
5th Cir.2015Background
- Mario Naranjo, a federal prisoner housed at a county jail managed by GEO Group, sued GEO and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Eighth Amendment overcrowding, fire-safety, and sanitation claims and related due-process and equal-protection allegations.
- After initial screening, the district court referred the case to a magistrate; defendants moved for summary judgment early and discovery followed, including three sensitive items filed under seal for security reasons.
- Naranjo, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, twice moved for appointment of counsel; the district court found "exceptional circumstances" on the second motion but denied appointment because no funding existed and no local attorneys would take the case pro bono.
- The magistrate held an evidentiary hearing at which Naranjo presented no testimony and repeatedly stated he lacked the legal skill to examine exhibits or cross-examine effectively, partly because he could not access sealed materials.
- While the appeal of the appointment denial was pending, the district court granted defendants’ renewed summary judgment motion; the Fifth Circuit consolidated the appeals.
- The Fifth Circuit held the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider its inherent power to compel an attorney to accept an uncompensated appointment and vacated both the denial of counsel and the summary judgment, remanding for renewed proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exceptional circumstances warranted appointment of counsel | Naranjo argued his prison status, inability to access sealed discovery, and need to present/conflict-testimony made counsel necessary | GEO argued claims not complex and Naranjo could cross-examine witnesses without counsel | Court: District did not clearly err — exceptional circumstances existed (inability to access sealed materials, conflicting testimony, poor participation at hearing) |
| Whether court may compel counsel to accept uncompensated appointment under inherent power | Naranjo sought appointment after pro bono search failed; court should require counsel if necessary to secure meaningful hearing | GEO contended Mallard bars compulsory appointments under §1915(e)(1) | Court: Mallard limited to statute; federal courts have inherent authority in rare cases to compel counsel when exceptional circumstances exist and volunteer counsel exhausted |
| Whether lack of local pro bono attorneys or funding justifies denying appointment | Naranjo maintained locality/funding constraints shouldn't bar appointment when exceptional circumstances exist | GEO/district court emphasized remoteness of Pecos and lack of willing counsel/funds | Court: Deference to resource constraints is insufficient; dearth of counsel is not a valid reason to deny appointment after other options exhausted |
| Whether summary judgment should stand after erroneous denial of counsel | Naranjo argued denial of counsel hindered ability to oppose summary judgment and present evidence | GEO argued merits supported summary judgment and later issues (e.g., Bivens/§1983 applicability) | Court: Vacated summary judgment and remanded so district court can reconsider appointment (including compulsory appointment if appropriate) and allow additional proceedings/discovery |
Key Cases Cited
- Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (§1915(e)(1) does not authorize compulsory appointment under the statute)
- Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (court authority to appoint counsel in capital cases; rooted in Sixth Amendment and necessity)
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) (in forma pauperis screening dismisses frivolous claims)
- Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1982) (appointment of counsel in civil rights cases requires exceptional circumstances)
- Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1992) (factors for assessing exceptional circumstances for appointment)
- Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993) (remedy of vacatur/remand and additional discovery when appointment denial affected summary judgment)
- Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (remedy is remand for retrial with pro bono counsel where appointment denial affected trial)
- Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (role of counsel and meaningful access to the courts)