Mario Johnson v. State of Tennessee, W2015-02498-CCA-R3-PC

Mario Johnson pleaded guilty to five counts of aggravated assault in an open plea; trial court accepted plea after Rule 11 colloquy.
At sentencing the court applied Range III persistent offender status, imposed 15 years per count, ordered some counts consecutive for an effective 30-year sentence with 45% release eligibility.
Johnson filed a timely post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because counsel misadvised him about likely sentence (assurances he would not get more than 15 years).
Trial counsel testified he met with Johnson repeatedly, advised that conviction risk was high based on eyewitness IDs and a recorded call, and warned Johnson he faced as much as 75 years as a career offender; counsel also explained division-to-division sentencing variability.
The post-conviction court credited counsel, found the plea knowing and voluntary, that counsel’s performance was not deficient, and denied relief; this Court affirmed.

Issue	Johnson's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance in advising plea/sentencing exposure	Counsel assured Johnson he would not receive more than 15 years; that advice induced the plea	Counsel advised accurately about worst-case exposure (including 75 years) and explained risks; plea was voluntary	Court held counsel's performance not deficient; post-conviction findings upheld
Whether guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary	Plea was product of ignorance/incomprehension because Johnson relied on counsel's alleged assurances	Plea colloquy and counsel’s advice show Johnson understood consequences and waived rights knowingly	Court held plea was knowing and voluntary; plea colloquy and record create strong presumption against collateral attack

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (applying Strickland in guilty-plea context; prejudice means would have gone to trial)
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (plea must be voluntary and intelligent; court must canvass defendant)
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (statements at plea colloquy carry strong presumption of truth)
Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996) (counsel performance assessed against objective reasonableness)
Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. 1997) (standards for evaluating counsel's performance and plea challenges)