167 F. Supp. 3d 472
S.D.N.Y.2016Background
- Plaintiffs Kathleen Makinen and Jamie Nardini, NYPD officers, were referred to the NYPD Counseling Services Unit (CSU) and diagnosed/treated for alcoholism despite their denials. Sergeant Daniel Sweeney supervised CSU; Raymond Kelly was NYPD Commissioner.
- Plaintiffs sued under the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL for discrimination based on perceived disability; after an 8-day jury trial the jury found liability only under the NYCHRL and awarded Makinen $46,100 and Nardini $105,000 (including punitive awards against Kelly and Sweeney).
- Defendants moved post-trial under Rule 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law and under Rule 59 for a new trial, raising six primary challenges including plaintiff disability status, sufficiency of adverse action, expert testimony, perceived-disability proof, individual liability, and damages.
- The court analyzed NYCHRL scope (perceived-disability claims need not meet the NYCHRL’s narrow alcoholism-definition), reiterated that NYCHRL requires only differential treatment (not materially adverse action), and reiterated allocation of burdens: plaintiffs prove perception; defendants prove inability to perform job.
- The court denied judgment as a matter of law on most grounds, upheld individual liability for Sweeney and direct-liability basis for Kelly, vacated punitive damages against Kelly (insufficient evidence of his state of mind), and denied the Rule 59 new-trial motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs must meet NYCHRL’s alcoholism definition (recovering/recovered and currently free) | Plaintiffs: NYCHRL protects against discrimination for actual or perceived disability; perceived-alcoholism claims need not meet the narrow §102(16) definition | Defendants: Plaintiffs must satisfy the NYCHRL alcoholism definition | Held: Plaintiffs need only show they were perceived as disabled; §102(16) definition does not limit perceived-disability claims under NYCHRL |
| Sufficiency of conduct (differential treatment vs. adverse employment action) | Plaintiffs: NYCHRL requires only differential treatment (treated "less well") | Defendants: Plaintiffs had to prove materially adverse employment action | Held: Court adheres to Mihalik — NYCHRL requires only differential treatment; Nardini’s restrictions sufficed for liability |
| Burden and proof of being wrongfully perceived as alcoholic | Plaintiffs: need show they were perceived as disabled; correctness of perception is relevant only to defendant’s affirmative defense | Defendants: Plaintiffs must prove the perception was incorrect (i.e., not active alcoholics) | Held: Plaintiffs bore burden to show they were perceived as disabled; defendants bore burden to prove inability to perform job; plaintiffs need not prove perception was wrong |
| Individual liability and punitive damages for Kelly and Sweeney | Plaintiffs: both individuals liable (aiding/abetting and employer/direct liability); punitive damages appropriate | Defendants: no personal liability for Kelly or Sweeney; insufficient evidence for punitive damages (esp. Kelly) | Held: Sweeney personally liable (participation and supervisory failures) and punitive damages against him upheld; Kelly may be held directly liable as employer but punitive damages against Kelly vacated for lack of evidence of requisite state of mind |
Key Cases Cited
- Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2009) (NYCHRL construed as providing protections at least as broad as federal/state law)
- Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2013) (NYCHRL requires only differential treatment, not materially adverse action)
- Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824 (N.Y. 2014) (allocation of burdens under NYCHRL; employer may raise inability-to-perform as affirmative defense)
- Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995) (individual liability where person actually participates in discriminatory conduct)
- Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (U.S. 1999) (punitive damages require malice or reckless indifference to federally protected rights)
- BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (U.S. 1996) (guideposts for reviewing punitive damages awards)