Marinello v. United States
138 S. Ct. 1101
| SCOTUS | 2018Background
- Between 2004–2009 the IRS intermittently investigated Carlo Marinello for tax violations; in 2012 he was indicted including under 26 U.S.C. §7212(a)’s Omnibus Clause for "corruptly... obstruct[ing] or imped[ing] the due administration of this title."
- The indictment alleged a range of obstructive acts (e.g., destroying records, hiding income, paying employees in cash).
- At trial the jury was instructed the government must find Marinello acted “corruptly” as defined by intent to secure an unlawful advantage, but was not instructed that he must have known of a particular IRS investigation or intended to interfere with one. Marinello was convicted.
- The Second Circuit affirmed, holding awareness of a particular IRS action was not required. Circuits were split on whether a pending or foreseeable proceeding is required.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether conviction under the Omnibus Clause requires the government to prove the defendant knew of (or could reasonably foresee) a particular tax-related administrative proceeding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §7212(a)’s Omnibus Clause requires awareness of a particular tax proceeding | Marinello: conviction requires the government prove the defendant knew of and intended to obstruct a pending IRS proceeding | Government: Clause reaches corrupt interference with Tax Code administration generally; no need to show knowledge of a particular proceeding | Court: Government must prove a nexus to a particular administrative proceeding that was pending or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant |
| Scope of “due administration of this title” — routine IRS functions vs. targeted acts | Marinello: (and majority) phrase refers to discrete targeted administrative acts (investigation, audit) not routine processing | Government: covers any corrupt effort that interferes with Tax Code administration, including routine processes | Court: reads phrase narrowly to avoid sweeping ordinary tax errors into felonies; requires nexus to particular proceeding |
| Whether the term “corruptly” cures overbreadth concerns | Marinello: (majority) mens rea alone insufficient to limit the statute practically | Government: “corruptly” (intent to obtain unlawful advantage) narrows statute enough | Court: rejects reliance on mens rea or prosecutorial discretion as adequate safeguard against overbreadth |
| Temporal/foreseeability element for obstruction under §7212(a) | Marinello: prosecution must show proceeding was pending or at least reasonably foreseeable when the obstructive act occurred | Government: need not prove a pending or foreseeable proceeding | Court: requires the proceeding be pending or reasonably foreseeable (nexus in time, causation, or logic) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (obstruction statute interpreted to require a nexus between defendant's act and a particular judicial proceeding)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (requiring foreseeability of an official proceeding for certain obstruction convictions)
- Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. (2015) (plurality) (distinguishing obstruction statutes and addressing scope of statutory language about investigations or administration)
- Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (discussing willfulness mens rea in tax offenses)