Marina Saucedo-Arevalo v. Eric Holder, Jr.
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6316
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Petitioner Saucedo-Arevalo entered the United States in 2002 and cannot meet the 10-year continuous physical presence requirement for cancellation of removal.
- Petitioner’s mother entered the United States in 1993; the BIA held the mother’s physical presence could not be imputed to petitioner.
- This court reviews de novo the BIA’s denial of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
- Barrios v. Holder clarified that imputation is limited to intent, state of mind, or legal status, not physical presence.
- The court compares NACARA and § 1229b(b)(1) and presumes identical meaning of ‘physical presence’ language.
- Petitioner argues for imputation of parental physical presence; the government argues Barrios confines imputation and physical presence is distinct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a parent’s physical presence can be imputed to the child for cancellation. | Saucedo-Arevalo seeks imputation of her mother's presence. | Holder restricts imputation to intent/state of mind or legal status; physical presence not imputable. | Imputation of physical presence is not permitted. |
| Whether Barrios controls this imputation question in the NACARA/§1229b context. | Barrios limitation should not apply beyond NACARA. | Barrios governs, limiting imputation to non-physical-presence factors. | Barrios applies; physical presence cannot be imputed. |
| Whether petitioner satisfies the 10-year continuous physical presence requirement. | Petitioner argues ongoing presence, counting through parental presence by imputation. | Imputation is limited and does not count parental presence for petitioner's own period. | Petitioner cannot meet the 10-year requirement. |
| Whether the NACARA and §1229b(b)(1) texts are to be interpreted identically for physical presence. | Argues textual differences justify different interpretations. | Texts are nearly identical; Congress intended the same meaning. | Same meaning presumed; physical presence is not imputable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005) (imputation of parent’s intent/state of mind to child in many immigration contexts)
- Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009) (imputation limited to intent/state of mind/legal status; physical presence not imputable for NACARA)
- Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (imputation discussed for residency requirements)
- Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1994) (parent’s lawful domicile imputable to child under certain circumstances)
- Senica v. INS, 16 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 1994) (parent’s knowledge/state of mind regarding fraudulent application imputed to child)
- Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (deals with imputation under Barrios framework)
- Vang v. INS, 146 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1998) (imputation related to minor’s firm residence context)