Marina D. Gooden v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 679 F. App'x 958

Background

Pro se plaintiff Marina Gooden sued Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury, alleging Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims for disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation, and asserted FTCA claims for emotional distress.
District court granted summary judgment for the Secretary, denied Gooden’s motions for default judgment, and dismissed FTCA claims as preempted by Title VII.
On appeal Gooden challenged (1) summary judgment on retaliation, disparate treatment, and hostile-work-environment claims (race, gender, disability); (2) denial of default judgment; and (3) preemption of FTCA claims.
Many allegations appeared only in Gooden’s unverified amended complaint; the district court and magistrate relied on facts the government cited in its statement of undisputed material facts.
The Eleventh Circuit construed Gooden’s pro se brief liberally, found several issues forfeited for not being raised below, and framed three preserved issues for review: prima facie disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Disparate treatment (race, gender, disability)	Smith made discriminatory comments, denied/stalled training, denied desk audit, physical harassment, computer tampering — these were adverse and motivated by protected traits	Many incidents are not adverse employment actions or lack evidence linking them to protected traits; some claims unexhausted or forfeited	Affirmed: plaintiff failed to show adverse employment actions or that similarly situated nonmembers were treated better; some claims forfeited or unexhausted
Hostile work environment (race, gender, disability)	Repeated discriminatory comments, incidents and physical contact created a hostile, severe, pervasive environment	Alleged incidents were infrequent, involved others outside protected classes, and amounted to workplace incivility rather than severe/pervasive harassment	Affirmed: harassment not shown to be sufficiently severe or pervasive or tied to protected characteristics
Retaliation	After contacting EEO, plaintiff faced push by supervisor, deleted files, attempted buy-off of complaint, workplace ostracism — materially adverse and causally connected	Many allegations predate protected activity, are speculative, not materially adverse, or lack causation; plaintiff relies on unverified complaint for many incidents	Affirmed: remaining considered incidents either predated protected activity, were speculative, or not materially adverse; no causal connection shown
FTCA claims (intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress)	FTCA tort claims arise from the same underlying conduct and should proceed	Title VII is the exclusive remedy for federal employment discrimination; FTCA claims are preempted where they parallel Title VII claims	Affirmed: FTCA emotional-distress claims preempted by Title VII

Key Cases Cited

Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2011) (summary judgment standard/de novo review)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (nonmoving party must present specific facts showing genuine dispute)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (need for sworn affidavits/evidence at summary judgment)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination)
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (intentional discrimination required for disparate treatment)
Trask v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016) (prima facie elements)
Burke‑Fowler v. Orange Cty., 447 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2006) (prima facie disparate treatment elements)
Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001) (definition of adverse employment action)
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (hostile-work-environment severity/pervasiveness standard)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (materially adverse standard for retaliation)