Marilyn Scheer v. Patrick Kelly, 817 F.3d 1183

Background

Scheer, a California attorney, was ordered to repay a client via State Bar enforcement after an arbitration award; she failed to repay and was placed on involuntary inactive enrollment (suspended).
Scheer exhausted State Bar internal review and sought review in the California Supreme Court, which denied her petition for review.
Scheer filed § 1983 claims in federal court alleging California’s attorney-discipline procedures violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments and that the Bar’s rules are facially unconstitutional.
The district court dismissed: as-applied claims were barred by Rooker–Feldman; facial claims failed on the merits. Scheer appealed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed: as-applied claims barred by Rooker–Feldman; facial claims were timely but substantively meritless.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are Scheer’s as-applied challenges to the State Bar’s discipline decision barred by Rooker–Feldman?	Scheer sought federal relief from the Bar’s discipline outcome.	The challenge is a de facto appeal of the state-court denial of review and thus barred.	Barred by Rooker–Feldman.
Are Scheer’s facial § 1983 challenges time-barred under the statute of limitations as interpreted in Action Apartment?	Facial claims brought after rules’ enactment are timely because injuries accrued when she was denied review.	Action Apartment requires accrual at enactment date; thus claims are untimely.	Action Apartment is limited to property/takings context; Scheer’s claims accrued on denial of review and are timely.
Do California’s attorney-discipline rules violate the First Amendment (right to access courts / free speech)?	Scheer contends denial of meaningful judicial review and regulation chills rights.	No established First Amendment right to a state court hearing; procedures do not impose a protected chill.	First Amendment claims fail—no freestanding right to state-court hearing shown; no cognizable chill established.
Do the procedures violate Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection?	Scheer argues discretionary review deprives meaningful judicial review and treats lawyers differently.	California provides constitutionally sufficient process; distinctive role of lawyers justifies differential regulation.	Due process and equal protection claims fail: procedures provide adequate process; rational-basis support for distinct regulation of lawyers.

Key Cases Cited

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (Rooker–Feldman applies to federal challenges that are de facto appeals)
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (defines Rooker–Feldman scope)
Action Apartment Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020 (statute-of-limitations rule for facial takings/property claims)
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111 (explains single-harm accrual in takings/property context)
Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147 (upholding facial challenges to longstanding ordinances)
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (First Amendment chill concept)
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (procedural due process notice and hearing standard)
Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Cal., 910 F.2d 561 (California provides constitutionally sufficient attorney-discipline procedures)
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (historical role of lawyers and state regulation)