Marilyn Adams v. Zimmer US, Inc., 943 F.3d 159

Marilyn Adams received a Zimmer total right hip replacement on January 18, 2011 and was largely fine until late 2012, when she developed recurrent severe right-hip pain and underwent diagnostic workups and treatment (including treatment for an infection in 2013).
After a November 2014 dislocation and follow-up in January 2015, Dr. Prodromos Ververeli ordered imaging showing calcification and a CT indicating an adverse local tissue reaction; he recommended revision surgery and recorded a diagnosis of “metallosis.”
Adams had a pre-op visit on January 30, 2015 and signed an informed-consent form February 9, 2015; she underwent revision surgery on February 12, 2015, at which time the surgeon found extensive corrosion, metal debris, muscle deterioration, and a pseudotumor and later told Adams of those intraoperative findings.
Adams sued Zimmer for defective design and failure to warn on February 10, 2017; Zimmer moved for summary judgment asserting the two-year statute of limitations accrued by January/February 2015.
The district court granted summary judgment as time-barred; the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that genuine factual disputes about when Adams reasonably should have known of injury and causation precluded deciding the discovery-rule accrual as a matter of law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When did the two-year statute of limitations begin under Pennsylvania's discovery rule?	Adams: accrual occurred Feb 12, 2015 when intraoperative findings made clear the implant caused injury.	Zimmer: accrual occurred by Jan 30 / Feb 9, 2015 when diagnosis/consent indicated metallosis and planned replacement.	Reversed district court; factual dispute exists about when a reasonably diligent person should have discovered injury and cause—jury must decide.
Does preoperative diagnosis/consent showing “metallosis” or plan to replace the femoral head constitute constructive/actual notice as a matter of law?	Adams: surgeon did not appreciate causation until intraop; medical terminology and consent do not necessarily convey knowledge of implant-caused injury.	Zimmer: pre-op diagnosis, consent, and Adams’s statements show she knew the Zimmer device was the problem.	Not as a matter of law; under precedent a jury may credit that the surgeon (and therefore patient) did not know causation until intraoperative discovery.
Was summary judgment appropriate on discovery-rule grounds?	Adams: no—reasonable minds could differ given diagnostic uncertainty and the surgeon’s intraop reassessment.	Zimmer: yes—undisputed facts show notice by Jan 30, 2015, so claims are time-barred.	Summary judgment inappropriate because material factual disputes remain; remand for further proceedings.

Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354 (Pa. 2009) (discovery rule accrual tied to actual or constructive knowledge of harm and a factual cause linked to another)
Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850 (Pa. 2005) (diagnostic uncertainty can create a jury question on accrual)
Nicolaou v. Martin, 195 A.3d 880 (Pa. 2018) (plaintiff may present reasonable-diligence question to a jury where diagnosis was uncertain or delayed)
Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479 (Pa. 2011) (factual questions on notice and diligence are for the jury; Pennsylvania’s discovery rule is narrow)
Coleman v. Wyeth Pharms., 6 A.3d 502 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (plaintiff charged only with medical knowledge actually communicated by treating providers)
Cochran v. GAF Corp., 666 A.2d 245 (Pa. 1995) (reasonable diligence requirement for tolling under discovery rule)
Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2003) (appellate standard for reviewing summary judgment in diversity cases)